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INTRODUCTION
From antiquity to the present, in times of peace and in conflict, and in
all corners of the globe, slavery1 and the slave trade2 have persisted.3 While
state-sponsored slave trades and de jure slavery institutions have been
abolished, de facto slavery situations and the slave trades that support them
continue.4 As in some of the worst slave trades of the past—namely, the
Trans-Atlantic and East African slave trades in which millions of Africans
were abducted and forcibly removed to the Americas, the Middle East, and
Asia between the 16th and early 20th centuries5—the global capitalist
economy remains dependent upon the slave trade and slavery-related
institutions, systems, and practices, in which perpetrators exercise
ownership powers over human beings in order to concentrate wealth and
resources for the benefit of societies’ elites.6
Slavery and the slave trade also fuel war machines in conflicts around
the world. Beginning in 2014, Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)
fighters in Iraq and Syria have and continue to enslave and slave trade Yazidi

1. Slavery is defined as “the status or condition of a person over whom any or all of the powers
attaching to the right of ownership are exercised.” Slavery Convention art. 1(1), Sept. 25, 1926, 46 Stat.
2183, 2191, 60 L.N.T.S. 253, 263 [hereinafter 1926 Slavery Convention]. “Status” is meant to cover de
jure slavery, while “condition” prohibits de facto slavery. See Patricia Viseur Sellers & Jocelyn Getgen
Kestenbaum, “Sexual Slavery” and Customary International Law, in THE PRESIDENT ON TRIAL:
PROSECUTING HISSÈNE HABRÉ 1, 366-67 (Sharon Weill et al. eds., 2022).
2. The slave trade is defined as:
“. . . all acts involved in the capture, acquisition or disposal of a person with intent to
reduce him to slavery; all acts involved in the acquisition of a slave with a view to selling or
exchanging him; all acts of disposal by sale or exchange of a slave acquired with a view to
being sold or exchanged, and, in general, every act of trade or transport in slaves.”
1926 Slavery Convention, art 1(2); see also 1956 Supplemental Slavery Convention (with slight revisions
to include additional forms of transport and expand protections to persons not yet enslaved).
Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices
Similar to Slavery, Sept. 7, 1956, 266 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter 1956 Supplementary Slavery Convention].
3. See Patricia Viseur Sellers & Jocelyn Getgen Kestenbaum, The International Crimes of Slavery and
the Slave Trade: A Feminist Critique, in GENDER AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 157 (Indira
Rosenthal, Valerie Oosterveld & Susana SáCouto eds., 2022).
4. JEAN ALLAIN, SLAVERY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: OF HUMAN EXPLOITATION AND
TRAFFICKING 109 (2013); see also Jean Allain, The Definition of Slavery in International Law, 52 HOW. L.J.
239, 258 (2009).
5. OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW 979 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed.
1992); DAVID B. DAVIS, THE PROBLEM OF SLAVERY IN WESTERN CULTURE 114–20 (1966); Seymour
Drescher & Paul Finkelman, Slavery, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE HISTORY OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 890, 890-97 (Bardo Fassbender & Anne Peters eds., 2012); U. O. Umozurike,
The African Slave Trade and the Attitudes of International Law Towards It, 16 HOW. L.J. 334, 341 (1971).
6. See, e.g., Fazenda Brasil Verde v. Brazil, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 318, ¶ 301 (Oct. 20, 2016) (holding that Brazilians laborers were not
entitled to pay and had no way to leave freely).
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women and children.7 The Committee for the Buying and Selling of Slaves
organized slave markets to “distribute” (i.e., slave trade) captured Yazidis as
property in the name of the Caliphate.8 ISIL policies have permitted fighters
to “buy, sell, or give as a gift female captives” who were considered to be
“war spoils.”9 The policy intentionally reduced “non-believing” women and
children of all genders into slavery.10 This system of slave trading and slavery
permitted sexualized violence in the course of enslavement11 as individual
ISIL fighters exerted various forms of ownership over the sexual autonomy
7. YAZDA & FREE YEZIDI FOUNDATION, ISIL NATIONALS OF ICC STATES PARTIES
COMMITTING GENOCIDE AND OTHER CRIMES AGAINST THE YAZIDIS 10-12 (2015) (redacted),
https://www.freeyezidi.org/wp-content/uploads/Corr-RED-ISIL-commiting-genocide-ag-the-Yazid
is.pdf; Letter to the ICC OCP as Global Justice Center Petitioners at 3, OTP-CR-397/15 (Dec. 17,
2015); Notably, IS has enslaved Muslim and other women and girls as well. This Article, however,
focuses on the Yazidi experience. See HRGJ Clinic of CUNY Law School, MADRE & OWFI,
COMMUNICATION TO ICC PROSECUTOR PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 15 OF THE ROME STATUTE
REQUESTING A PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION INTO THE SITUATION OF: GENDER-BASED
PERSECUTION AND TORTURE AS CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY AND WAR CRIMES COMMITTED BY
THE ISLAMIC STATE OF IRAQ AND THE LEVANT (ISIL) IN IRAQ, submitted Nov. 8, 2017,
https://www.madre.org/sites/default/files/PDFs/CUNY%20MADRE%20OWFI%20Article%201
5%20Communication%20Submission%20Gender%20Crimes%20in%20Iraq%20PDF.pdf. For a
discussion on how enslavement may constitute a form of gender persecution, see Lisa Davis, Dusting
off the Law Books on Gender Persecution: Recognizing Gender-Based Crimes in Conflict and Atrocities, 20 NW. J.
HUM. RTS. 1, 6 (2021); see also Doughty Street Chambers, German Court Convicts a Third ISIS Member of
Crimes Against Humanity Committed Against Yazidis, DOUGHTY STREET CHAMBERS (July 26, 2021),
https://www.doughtystreet.co.uk/news/german-court-convicts-third-isis-member-crimes-againsthumanity-committed-against-yazidis.
8. Patricia Viseur Sellers & Jocelyn Getgen Kestenbaum, Missing in Action: The International Crime
of the Slave Trade, 18 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 517, 519 (2020); Notice On Buying Sex Slaves, Homs province
(photograph), in ARCHIVE OF ISLAMIC STATE ADMINISTRATIVE DOCUMENTS (June 15, 2015),
http://www.aymennjawad.org/2016/01/archive-of-islamic-state-administrative-documents-1
(last
visited Sept. 27, 2019) [hereinafter Homs Notice]; Human Rights Council: They Came to Destroy, U.N.
Doc. A/HRC/32/CRP.2, at 10-13 (June 15, 2016, 2007) [hereinafter They Came to Destroy];
UNAMI/OHCHR Report, ‘A Call for Accountability and Protection: Yezidi Survivors of Atrocities Committed
by ISIL,’ Aug. 2016, available online at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/IQ
/UNAMIReport12Aug2016_en.pdf (last visited Sept. 27, 2019) (hereinafter “UNAMI/OHCHR
Report”). Yazidis reported that, prior to their enslavement, they were registered by officials at holding
centers in Syria, loaded onto trucks, and moved to holding sites in Iraq. ISIS required fighters to preregister for their slave purchases of females priced and sold according to their ages. ISIS fighters
documented names, ages, and marital statuses, and photographed Yazidi women, girls, and boys at
these holding sites. At times, ISIS auctioned Yazidi women and children online, replete with
registration information, photos, and minimum purchase prices. Homs Notice; They Came to Destroy,
supra note 8, at § 43, 57, 58, UNAMI/OHCHR Report. ISIS created the Islamic Caliphate and
considered it a state ruled by Islamic Sharia law. Graeme Wood, What ISIS Really Wants, THE ATLANTIC
(Mar.
2015),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/03/what-isis-really-wants/
384980/ (last visited Jan. 7, 2020); ISIS Fast Facts, CNN (Dec. 4, 2019), https://www.
cnn.com/2014/08/08/world/isis-fast-facts/index.html (last visited Jan. 7, 2020).
9. See Islamic State (ISIS) Releases Pamphlet on Female Slaves, M.D. E. MEDIA RES. INST. (Dec. 3,
2014), http://www.memrijttm.org/islamic-state-isis-releases-pamphlet-on-female-slaves.html (last
visited Sept. 27, 2019).
10. The Revival of Slavery Before the Hour, 4 DABIQ 15. IS. D.013, IS D.014 (Sept. 2015) at 15; They
Came to Destroy, supra note 8, at § 55. ISIS often presented Yazidi women and girls ‘as a package’ until
girls reached the age of nine and, thereafter, sold them separately. Id. at §§ 81, 82.
11. See SELLERS & KESTENBAUM, supra note 1, at 366.
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of Yazidi women and girls.12 Yazidi boys, also enslaved, were forced to
convert to Islam, to perform forced labor, and to train and fight with ISIL
in military camps in Iraq and Syria.13 Thousands of Yazidis remain in
captivity or are among the missing at the time of this writing.14
Active since the 1980s, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) “abducted”
and “transferred” (i.e., slave traded) Ugandan adults and children of all
genders into slavery, including sexualized enslavement, to furnish the war
effort.15 Men were porters and boys were conscripted to serve as child
soldiers.16 Women were “gifted” as “wives” to LRA soldiers, while
prepubescent girls, called “ting tings,” cooked, cleaned, and performed
domestic chores until they reached sexual maturity and could be “gifted” to
LRA soldiers as “wives.”17 All ages and genders experienced slavery and
slave trade harms; the children born to enslaved mothers were enslaved, i.e.,
owned and controlled in all aspects of their beings.18
Outside of conflict-related enslavement, a recent domestic criminal case
in Lebanon alleges that sponsors under the kafala system subjected Meseret,
an Ethiopian migrant domestic worker, to, among other crimes, slavery and
slave trading.19 Meseret’s kafeel recruited and then held her captive in an
12. Geraldine Boezio, Escaping from ISIL, a Yazidi Sexual Violence Survivor Rebuilds Her Life, OFF.
OF THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE U.N. SEC’Y GEN. ON SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN CONFLICT
(July 10, 2018), https://www.un.org/sexualviolenceinconflict/escaping-from-isil-a-yazidi-sexualviolence-survivor-rebuilds-her-life/ (last visited Sept. 27, 2020).
13. They Came to Destroy, supra note 10, at §§ 40, 82, 93. See also Johanna Groß, Negotiation Day —
Main Trial Against Taha Al-J, AMNESTY INT’L (June 9, 2020), https://amnesty-voelkerstrafrecht.de/9verhandlungstag-hauptverhandlung-gegen-taha-al-j-09-juni-2020/.
14. Pari Ibrahim & Murad Ismael, Seven Years After the Genocide, Yazidis are Still Waiting for Justice,
WASH. POST (Aug. 3, 2021), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/08/03/yezidis-arestill-waiting-justice-seven-years-later/; Margaret Evans, Beekeeper Turned Spymaster Searches for Iraq’s
Missing Yazidis, CBC NEWS (Apr. 16, 2021), https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/yazidi-iraq-syria-isis1.5989166. Other human rights violations or international crimes, such as enforced disappearances,
also could be alleged; however, my focus here is on slavery and the slave trade.
15. Prosecutor v. Ongwen, ICC-02/04-01/15, Trial Judgment, ¶ 67 (Feb. 4, 2021),
https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2021_01026.PDF; Patricia Viseur Sellers & Jocelyn
Getgen Kestenbaum, Conversations under the Rome Statute—Enslavement and Sexual Slavery, OPINIO JURIS
(June 11, 2021), http://opiniojuris.org/2021/06/11/conflict-related-sexual-violence-symposiumconversations-under-the-rome-statute-enslavement-and-sexual-slavery/.
16. Prosecutor v. Ongwen, ICC-02/04-01/15, Trial Judgment, at 1064-65 (Feb. 4, 2021),
https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2021_01026.PDF.
17. Id. at 1059.
18. Id. at 752. Patricia Viseur Sellers & Jocelyn Getgen Kestenbaum, Conversations under the Rome
Statute—Enslavement and Sexual Slavery, OPINIO JURIS (June 11, 2021), http://opiniojuris.org/2021/
06/11/conflict-related-sexual-violence-symposium-conversations-under-the-rome-statuteenslavement-and-sexual-slavery/.
19. Legal Action Worldwide (LAW), I Was Kept a Slave for Seven Years in Beirut, DALEEL MADANI
(Oct. 8, 2020), https://daleel-madani.org/civil-society-directory/legal-action/press-releases/i-waskept-slave-seven-years-beirut. For additional information on the kafala system, see LEGAL ACTION
WORLDWIDE, POLICY BRIEF, THE KAFALA SYSTEM IN LEBANON: HOW CAN WE OBTAIN DIGNITY
AND RIGHTS FOR DOMESTIC MIGRANT WORKERS? 5-6 (2020), https://acrobat.adobe.com/
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apartment for more than seven years without pay; her captor subjected her
to physical and verbal abuse and did not permit her to contact her family.20
Unfortunately, Meseret’s case is not an isolated one. Indeed, the kafala
system’s reliance on private sponsors and lack of labor protections make the
system particularly susceptible to slavery and the slave trade, among other
crimes.21
Despite these examples, slavery and the slave trade as international
crimes rarely if ever are prosecuted at the domestic and international levels,
due not only to outsized attention to human trafficking domestically and to
structural deficiencies of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court (ICC), but also due to misapplication (slavery) or nonapplication
(slave trade) of existing international law.22 Additionally, while the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) has determined that every state, as a
member of the international community of states, has a legal interest in
protecting certain fundamental human rights, “including protection from
slavery [,] . . . .”23 state responsibility to respect and “ensure respect” for
international human rights—as well as third party states’ obligations as
members of the international community of states to eradicate slavery and
the slave trade—is underutilized as a critical complement to pursuing
domestic and international criminal prosecutions.24
link/review?uri=urn:aaid:scds:US:c6df325f-0476-3f3b-b7ca-0fe04b7cd5da (arguing that the system
amounts to slavery and slave trading under international law).
20. Id.
21. See, e.g., Lebanon: Abolish the Kafala (Sponsorship) System, HUM. RTS. WATCH (July 27, 2020),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/07/27/lebanon-abolish-kafala-sponsorship-system; Patrick Rak,
Modern Day Slavery: The Kafala System in Lebanon, HARV. INT’L REV. (Dec. 21, 2020),
https://hir.harvard.edu/modern-day-slavery-the-kafala-system-in-lebanon/.
22. Sellers & Kestenbaum, supra note 18; Janie Chuang, Exploitation Creep and the Unmaking of
Human Trafficking Law, 108 AM. J. INT’L L. 609, 609-49 (2014). Another reason for insufficient attention
is because states themselves have rendered international criminal law accountability an exceptional
undertaking, only for those most responsible for international crimes, and only when states are
unwilling and unable to provide adequate redress at the domestic level. See Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court preamble, July 1, 2002, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute]. For
an in-depth discussion of complementarity in international criminal law, see generally, MOHAMED EL
ZEIDY, THE PRINCIPLE OF COMPLEMENTARITY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW (2008).
23. Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. (Belg. v. Spain), Judgment, 1970 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 32, at 34
(Feb. 5). See also East Timor (Portugal v. Australia), Judgment, 1995 I.C.J. Reports, 90, at 102, ⁋ 29
(June 30); Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. Reports,
226, at 258, ⁋ 83 (July 8); Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide, Preliminary Objections, Judgment, 1996 I.C.J. Reports, 595, at 615–16, ⁋⁋ 31–32
(July 11).
24. Urmila Bhoola & Kari Panaccione, Slavery Crimes and the Mandate of the United Nations Special
Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Slavery, 14 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 363, 368 (2016); Draft Articles on
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, art. 42(b), U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001), reprinted in
[2001] Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 (Part 2) [hereinafter Draft
Articles on State Responsibility]. The obligation to respect and to “ensure respect” for international
law is well established. See, e.g., Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and
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Consequently, human rights violations of slavery and the slave trade
rarely if ever have been brought before international judicial or quasi-judicial
mechanisms even when those mechanisms explicitly are obligated to
monitor state compliance with these prohibitions of most serious concern.
Slavery and slave trade prohibitions are norms that are: non-derogable
(meaning even in times of public emergency the rights cannot be
suspended), peremptory or jus cogens (meaning that no justification exists to
avoid state responsibility for a breach of such prohibitions) with erga omnes
obligations (meaning states owe duties to all other states to eradicate these
harms anywhere).25 Related prohibitions of human trafficking and forced
labor do not hold such super-normative status in international law.26 As a
result of inaction, victims have not received adequate and full expressive
justice for these harms of fundamental concern to the international
community.
The question that remains, however, is how recommitting to enforcing
the human rights prohibitions of slavery and the slave trade more broadly
under international human rights law (IHRL) would fill impunity gaps in
accountability and justice for these harms. For some, it may be enough to
argue that we have such legal tools and should therefore employ them where
applicable; others, however, might regard such tools as no longer relevant,
or even duplicative. In an era in which: (1) domestic and transnational
criminal law, as well as human rights advocacy, focus on related harms of
inter alia human trafficking and forced labor; and (2) the international
community has established the world’s first permanent international
criminal court, the ICC, to hold individual perpetrators accountable for
international crimes, why do we need to hold states accountable for slavery
and slave trade human rights violations outside of domestic and
international criminal law frameworks?
Ensuring state accountability for human rights violations of slavery and
the slave trade matter for at least three reasons. First, within the human
rights framework, slavery and the slave trade prohibitions enjoy the highest
Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations
of International Humanitarian Law, G.A. Res. No. 60/147 (Dec. 16, 2005). But see, e.g., recent IACtHR
cases Fazenda Brasil Verde Workers v. Brazil and Lopez Soto y Otros v. Venezuela in which slavery
perpetration has been addressed as a violation of human rights. López Soto y Otros v. Venezuela,
Funds, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 362, 43-44 (Sept. 26, 2018);
Fazenda Brasil Verde Workers v. Brazil, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs,
Judgement, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 318 (Oct. 20, 2016).
25. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (defining
jus cogens). See Jocelyn Getgen Kestenbaum, Disaggregating Slavery and the Slave Trade, 18 FL. INT’L U. L.
REV. 515, 559-65 (2022) (examining the Human Rights Committee’s lack of attention to slavery and
complete failure to address the slave trade).
26. Human trafficking, for example, is a transnational crime and a human rights violation when
perpetrated against women and children. See discussion in Part III, infra at 36-38.
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protective status under international law and, consequently, open up
additional legal avenues for state accountability and victim redress. Second,
enforcing human rights prohibitions of slavery and the slave trade against
states in addition to international slavery crimes against individual
perpetrators will advance more fully expressive functions of international
law while centering victims and more comprehensively redressing harms.
Third, enforcing human rights norms prohibiting slavery and the slave trade
will more directly address the structures and institutions that perpetuate
slavery and the slave trade as an effective, preventive, and reparative
complement to the international and domestic criminal legal responses that
target individual perpetrators for retribution and punishment but are not
designed to change existing domestic legal structures, policies, or practices.
While challenges to combating impunity for slavery harms will continue
given our current legal structures that support domination and
subordination in many facets of the law and global economy, recommitting
to holding states accountable for violations of slavery and the slave trade
prohibitions will fill important gaps in efforts toward eradicating two of the
oldest and most persistent harms prohibited under international law.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I explains the breadth and
elevated normative status of slavery and the slave trade in international law
to demonstrate how slavery and the slave trade prohibitions advance legal
avenues for state accountability and victim redress in addition to
prohibitions of human trafficking and forced labor. Part II builds upon
theoretical explanations for state compliance with international law,
including human rights treaty law, to offer reasons as to why the
prohibitions of slavery and slave trade treaty regimes matter for
accountability for slavery and the slave trade harms to states in addition to
individual perpetrators under domestic and international criminal law
frameworks.
Part III then turns to examining some critical gaps in international and
domestic criminal law, as well as human rights law regimes’ redress of
slavery, the slave trade, and human trafficking to demonstrate the need to
recommit to enforcing state compliance with the prohibitions of slavery and
the slave trade. Part IV then also offers some challenges to recommitting to
slavery and slave trade prohibitions despite the opportunities in expanding
avenues for victim redress, confronting structural issues at domestic levels,
and improving the expressive functions of international law.
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I. SLAVERY AND SLAVE TRADE PROHIBITIONS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
A. The 1926 Slavery Convention and the 1956 Supplementary Slavery Convention
The abolition of slave trading in the 19th and early 20th centuries
preceded the development of the international proscription of slavery and
the slave trade in the 1926 Convention for the Suppression of Slavery and
the Slave Trade (1926 Slavery Convention).27 In 1924, in response to
continued de jure slave trading in Ethiopia and slavery practices in Africa,28
the Council of the League of Nations constituted the Temporary Slavery
Commission to develop an international treaty to eradicate the slave trade
and slavery-related harms.29 In its 1925 final report, the Commission urged
states to “aboli[sh] the legal status of slavery.”30
The 1926 Slavery Convention enumerates slavery’s and the slave trade’s
elements while defining the prohibition broadly to govern all acts that slave
owners and slave traders perpetrated and all harms that enslaved persons
experienced,31 including future enslavement and slave trading acts.32 The
1926 Slavery Convention calls on states “to prevent and suppress the slave
trade”33 and “to bring about . . . the complete abolition of slavery in all its
forms.”34 The Convention defines slavery as “the status or condition of a
person over whom any or all of the powers attaching to the right of
ownership are exercised”35 and the slave trade as:
. . . all acts involved in the capture, acquisition or disposal of a
person with intent to reduce him to slavery; all acts involved in the
acquisition of a slave with a view to selling or exchanging him; all
27. 1926 Slavery Convention, supra note 1. Although slave-raiding and large-scale dealing had all
but ended in the African colonies by World War I, labor exploitation (i.e., forced labor) was extremely
prominent and necessary for the colonial economy. See VLADISLAVA STOYANOVA, HUMAN
TRAFFICKING AND SLAVERY RECONSIDERED: CONCEPTUAL LIMITS AND STATES’ POSITIVE
OBLIGATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 192-93 (2017); Suzanne Miers & Richard Roberts,
Introduction, in THE END OF SLAVERY IN AFRICA 3, 21 (Suzanne Miers & Richard Roberts eds., 1988).
28. Jean Allain, Slavery and the League of Nations: Ethiopia as a Civilized Nation, 8 J. HIST. INT’L L.
213, 224 (2006).
29. Id. See also Temporary Slavery Commission, Slavery and Other Systems Restrictive of Liberty, League
of Nations Doc. CTE 36, Memorandum by F. D. Lugard, Annex 3, “Conditions in Abyssinia,” pp. 12 (1925).
30. Report of the Temporary Slavery Commission adopted in the Course of its Second Session, 13th-25th July,
1925, League of Nations Doc A.19.1925. VI (1925).
31. For an in-depth analysis of the gendered dimensions of slavery and the slave trade, see Sellers
& Kestenbaum, supra note 3.
32. But see Research Network on the Legal Parameters of Slavery, The Bellagio-Harvard Guidelines on
the Legal Parameters of Slavery, https://glc.yale.edu/sites/default/files/pdf/the_bellagio-_harvard_
guidelines_on_the_legal_parameters_of_slavery.pdf (Mar. 3, 2012).
33. 1926 Slavery Convention, supra note 27, at art. 2.
34. Id.
35. Id. at art. 1(1).
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acts of disposal by sale or exchange of a slave acquired with a view
to being sold or exchanged, and, in general, every act of trade or
transport in slaves.36
The drafter’s ambitions to advance broad legal definitions of slavery and
the slave trade are clear in its’ preparatory works,37 the 1925 and 1926
Temporary Slavery Commission Reports,38 and in the final treaty language.39
The slavery definition’s emphasis on “status” or “condition” served to
extend the prohibition to both de jure slavery, evidenced by legal title or
status, and de facto slavery, evidenced by customary practice or condition.40
The broad array of means and modes of transport to reduce or maintain a
person in a situation of slavery, as well as the exclusion of any requirement
of exercise of powers attaching to ownership over a person, similarly defined
the slave trade in a way that contemplated current and future perpetration

36. Id. at art. 1(2). See also JEAN ALLAIN, SLAVERY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: OF HUMAN
EXPLOITATION AND TRAFFICKING 95 (2012) (discussing how the 1956 Supplementary Convention
broadens this definition by including “all acts of disposal by sale or exchange of a person acquired with
a view to being sold or exchanged” as well as “by any means of conveyance.”).
37. See Sellers & Kestenbaum, supra note 3; Patricia Viseur Sellers & Jocelyn Getgen Kestenbaum,
Sexual Slavery and Customary International Law, in THE PRESIDENT ON TRIAL: PROSECUTING HISSENE
HABRE 379 n.102 (Sharon Weill et al. eds., 2020); JEAN ALLAIN, THE SLAVERY CONVENTIONS, THE
TRAVAUX PRÉPARATOIRES OF THE 1926 LEAGUE OF NATIONS CONVENTION AND THE 1956
UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION (2008) (hereinafter Allain, Travaux Préparatoires); Jean Allain, A Legal
Consideration Slavery in Light of the Travaux Préparatoires of the 1926 Convention (2006), paper presented at
the Twenty-First Century Slavery: Issues and Responses Conference, The Wilberforce Institute for the
Study of Slavery and Emancipation (WISE).
38. Slavery Convention: Report presented to the Assembly by the Sixth Committee, League of Nations Doc.
A.104.1926.VI (1926) (hereinafter “Temporary Slavery Commission 1926 Report”).
39. Patricia Viseur Sellers & Jocelyn Getgen Kestenbaum, Sexual Slavery and Customary International
Law, in THE PRESIDENT ON TRIAL: PROSECUTING HISSENE HABRE 379 n.102 (Sharon Weill et al.
eds., 2020). But see Ramona Vijeyarasa & Jose Miguel Bello y Villarino, Modern-Day Slavery – a Judicial
Catchall for Trafficking, Slavery and Labour Exploitation: A Critique of Tang and Rantsev, 9 J. INT’L L. &
INT’L REL. 38, 56 (2013).
40. Brief for Helen Duffy, ‘Human Rights in Practice,’ as Amici Curiae, Fazenda Brasil Verde v.
Brazil, Inter-Am Ct. H.R. No. 12.066. See also The Queen v Tang [2008] HCA 39, Part III (Austl.)
(examining the application of the 1926 Slavery Convention to both de jure and de facto slavery). In 1926,
although slavery and the slave trade had been abolished in North and South America, Zanzibar, and
other tributaries of the Arab East African slave trade, members of the League of Nations remained
concerned, mainly, with ending de jure, chattel slavery and vestiges of the slave trade. Concerns that
limited the scope of some discussions arose mainly from member states’ own practices as colonizing
powers who engaged in slavery ownership and exploitative labor practices. Temporary Slavery
Commission 1926 Report, supra note 38. The initial objective was to banish de jure slavery and
distinguish the practice of forced labor from slavery. See Jean Allain, The Definition of Slavery in
International Law, 52 HOW. L. REV. 239, 244 (2009) (citing Viscount Cecil: “I do not think that there is
any nation, civilised or uncivilised, which does not possess powers enabling the Government, for
certain purposes and under certain restrictions, to require forced or compulsory labour on the part of
its citizens.”). Report Presented by the Sixth Comm. On the Question of Slavery: Resolution, 19th mtg. at 156, in
LEAGUE OF NATIONS OFFICIAL JOURNAL (Special Supplement 33), (Sept. 26, 1925). Human
trafficking, at the time, was pursued separately under the “white slave traffic” of women and girls into
exploitation and prostitution.
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in broad terms.41
The independent expert-members of the Temporary Slavery
Commission endorsed a comprehensive definition of slavery that
encompassed de jure and de facto situations whenever the exercise of powers
attaching to the rights of ownership over a person was met.42 For example,
the 1925 Temporary Slavery Commission’s report affirmed that “debt
slavery,” the enslaving of persons disguised as child adoption, and the
acquisition of girls by purchase disguised as dowry payment, etc., constituted
slavery whenever the intent plus the acts in question met the legal definition
of slavery.43 Thus, while the political realities of 20th century colonialism
forced a legal delineation of slavery from “slavery-like practices,” lesser
servitudes, and forced labor,44 the legal definition of slavery nonetheless
remained inclusive of practices by other names, such as concubinage, when
the elements constituted exercise of powers attaching to the rights of
ownership over a person.45
The Temporary Slavery Commission 1926 Report’s definition of slavery
was enumerated as Article 1(1) of the 1926 Slavery Convention.46 The
definition of “slavery in all its forms”47 does not refer to all of the various
practices or manifestations of slavery; instead, “forms” refers to de facto cases
that are absent of legal ownership, as well as de jure slavery, or slavery under
law.48 Factual circumstances that do not constitute an exercise of powers
attaching to the right of ownership over a person are not slavery under
international law, whether de jure or de facto.49
41. Sellers & Kestenbaum, supra note 8, at 520.
42. See Sellers & Kestenbaum, supra note 39; JEAN ALLAIN, THE LAW AND SLAVERY 423–24
(2015) (hereinafter ALLAIN, THE LAW AND SLAVERY). Despite this fact, in the 1980s there was a
perception that the definition of slavery was too narrow, leading to efforts to expand advocacy into
slavery-like practices and human trafficking. See Michael Dottridge, Trafficked and Exploited: The Urgent
Need for Coherence in International Law, in REVISITING THE LAW AND GOVERNANCE OF TRAFFICKING,
FORCED LABOR AND MODERN SLAVERY 68 (Prabha Kotiswaran ed., 2017).
43. Annex: Draft Convention, League of Nations Official Journal (Special Supplement 33) Records of the Sixth
Assembly: Text of Debates, League of Nations Doc. 439 (1925); see also Minutes of the Second Session, League
of Nations Doc. C.426.M.157 1925. VI. ¶ 55 (1925), available at https://perma.cc/8FEP-CDBW
[hereinafter Temporary Slavery Commission Second Session Minutes].
44. For a more in-depth look at the confusion in international law between slavery and forced
labor, see Vladislava Stoyanova, United Nations Against Slavery, 38 MICH. J. INT’L L. 359, 370-72 (2017).
45. Temporary Slavery Commission Second Session Minutes, supra note 43, at 62.
46. 1926 Slavery Convention, supra note 27, at art. 1(1).
47. Temporary Slavery Commission 1926 Report, supra note 38, at 1–2, 4.
48. Id.
49. ALLAIN, THE LAW AND SLAVERY, at 423–24. The Temporary Slavery Commission’s 1925
Report stated:
In order to eradicate practices restrictive of liberty so far as they may occur in
connection with marriage, concubinage, and adoption, the first object should be to
strengthen the law so as to enable the courts to repress all abuses, and, secondly and more
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As noted, the 1926 Slavery Convention separately prohibited the
distinct, related crime of the slave trade, proscribing the procurement and
placement of persons into slavery situations as well as the trade or transport
of persons enslaved, under article 1(2). The slave trade prohibition sanctions
perpetrators who possess the intention and who act to reduce a person into
a condition of de jure or de facto slavery and—as importantly—perpetrators
who exchange or transport an enslaved person to other slave traders or into
other conditions of slavery. Even though a slave trader must intend to
reduce a person to slavery, the slave trade crime definition does not require
the enslavement to occur for the successful perpetration of the crime of the
slave trade.50 Additionally, the slave trader does not need to exercise powers
attaching to the rights of ownership over a person to have committed acts
of the slave trade.51
The 1926 Slavery Convention recognized the distinct nature of these
crimes and the potential for individuals to perpetrate one, the other, or both
crimes because these practices occur in tandem52 and their institutions are
interlinked.53 The prohibition of slavery criminalizes the status or condition
of slavery. Slave trading prohibits the intent to reduce a person into a
situation of slavery or the transportation or transfer of an enslaved person.54
Slave trading is precursory to slavery (except for individuals born into
slavery) and can occur during or after slavery.55 Slave trading is not a lesser
especially, to take measures in order that everyone should be fully aware that the status of
slavery is in no way recognised by law.
The Second Session meeting minutes of the Temporary Slavery Commission in 1925 describe
that “concubinage” fits squarely within the intended meaning of slavery as it is distinguished from
wives. Temporary Slavery Commission Second Session Minutes, supra note 43, at 62.
50. Jeremy Prestholdt, The Island as Nexus: Zanzibar in the Nineteenth Century, in AFRICAN ISLANDS:
LEADING EDGES OF EMPIRE AND GLOBALIZATION 317, 330 (Toyin Falola, R. Joseph Parrot, &
Danielle Porter Sanchez eds., 2019) (recounting the experience of an Ethiopian girl who was slave
traded at least four times before being bought by a master in Zanzibar). Trafficking scholars note
challenges in attempted trafficking cases whereby traffickers caught at borders often are charged with
related crimes, such as migrant smuggling. Migrant smuggling, however, implicates each person
involved in the crime and denies trafficking victims’ rights to remedy given the inchoate trafficking
offense. In cases where the slave trade is present, slave trade charges would not deny victims their
victimhood or rights to remedy. For a discussion of the trafficking and smuggling context, see Anne
Gallagher, Human Rights and the New UN Protocols on Trafficking and Migrant Smuggling: A Preliminary
Analysis, 23 HUM. RTS. Q. 975, 975-1004 (2001).
51. 1926 Slavery Convention, supra note 46, at art. 1(2).
52. Patricia Viseur Sellers & Jocelyn Getgen Kestenbaum, Sexualized Slavery and Customary
International Law, in THE PRESIDENT ON TRIAL: PROSECUTING HISSENE HABRE 366 (Sharon Weill et
al. eds., 2020).
53. Patricia M. Muhammad, The Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade: A Forgotten Crime Against Humanity as
Defined by International Law, 19 AM. UNIV. INT’L L. REV. 884, 933-46 (2003).
54. Harman van der Wilt, Trafficking in Human Beings, Enslavement, Crimes against Humanity:
Unravelling the Concepts, 13 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 297, 303 (2014); see also Anne T. Gallagher, Human Rights
and Human Trafficking: Quagmire or Firm Ground? A Response to James Hathaway, 49 VA. J. INT’L L. 789-848
(2009).
55. Sellers & Kestenbaum, supra note 8, at 520.
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offense, or a subset of slavery.56 The slave trader is not a mere accessory to
slavery, such as an aider or abettor.57 Perpetrators who engage in slave
trading—intending and, therefore, acting to reduce a person to the status of
a slave—still commit the crime of the slave trade even if they learn that the
intended buyer chose not to exercise powers of ownership over the
person.58 Under law, slavery and the slave trade are separately perpetrated
crimes and often are perpetrated by separate individuals.59
The 1926 Slavery Convention’s and 1956 Supplementary Slavery
Convention’s slavery and slave trade definitions are widely accepted
prohibitions under international custom and treaty law.60 Multiple
subsequent international instruments that include definitions of slaveryrelated crimes mirror, with slight deviations, the Slavery Convention
definitions of slavery.61 Later human rights treaties have adopted the
definitions of the slave trade and slavery promulgated by the 1926 and 1956
Slavery Conventions.62 The 1956 Supplementary Convention on the
Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar
to Slavery (1956 Supplementary Slavery Convention)63 reinforces the
international prohibitions that “slavery and the slave trade in all their forms”
“are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever.”64
The ad hoc Committee on Slavery drafted the 1956 Supplementary
Slavery Convention, recommending that slavery and the slave trade
definitions “should continue to be accepted as accurate and adequate
definition[s] of [these] term[s],”65 while further broadening the prohibitions
to forms of servitude—later enumerated as “practices similar to slavery.”66
56. Sellers & Kestenbaum, supra note 3.
57. Id. at 34.
58. Sellers & Kestenbaum, supra note 8, at 527.
59. Allain and Bales illustrate the point of precursory conduct and distinctiveness of crimes: Jean
Allain and Kevin Bales, Slavery and Its Definition, 14 GLOB. DIALOGUE 1, 5 (2012).
60. Jean Allain, The Definition of Slavery in International Law, 52 HOW. L.J. 239, 240 (2009);
INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN
LAW 328 (Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 1st ed. 2005), https://www.icrc.org
/eng/assets/files/other/customary-international-humanitarian-law-i-icrc-eng.pdf. Rule 94 states that,
“[t]he military manuals and the legislation of many States prohibit slavery and the slave trade, or
‘enslavement.’” Id.
61. See, e.g., 1956 Supplementary Slavery Convention, supra note 2; Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court, July 1, 2002, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3.
62. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 8(1), Dec. 16, 1966, S. Exec.
Rep. 102–23, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; European Convention on Human Rights art. 4, Nov. 4, 1950, 213
U.N.T.S. 221 (prohibiting slavery and forced labor, but not the slave trade).
63. 1956 Supplementary Slavery Convention, supra note 61, at 40.
64. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609.
65. Economic and Social Council, Rep. of the Ad hoc Comm. on Slavery (Second Session), U.N. Doc.
E/1988, at 19 (May 4, 1951).
66. Id. ¶¶ 13-19. The Committee listed debt bondage, serfdom, servile marriages, and child
exploitation. Id.
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Moreover, in 1953, the UN Secretary General reiterated that these and other
servitudes could constitute slavery when factually “any or all of the powers
attaching to the right of ownership [over a person] are exercised.”67 Thus,
the law maintained the slavery definition as exercising powers attaching to
the rights of ownership—as opposed to exploitation or compulsory labor,
which may indicate such exercise of ownership.
Article 3 of the 1956 Supplementary Slavery Convention68 updated the
slave trade’s definition, adding aircraft to the list of transportation means.69
The 1956 Supplementary Convention, without explanation or debate, also
expanded the slave trade definition by changing “all acts of disposal . . . of
a slave” to “all acts of disposal . . . of a person,” expanding protections,
possibly unintentionally, to individuals who may be disposed of before
entering into situations of slavery.70

B. Human Rights Treaty Prohibitions
Aside from the 1926 Slavery Convention and 1956 Supplementary
Slavery Convention, slavery and the slave trade are prohibited in several
international instruments, including the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (UDHR), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR), the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR), and the

67. U.N. Secretary-General, Slavery, the Slave Trade, and other forms of Servitude, ¶¶ 36-7, U.N. Doc.
E/2357 (Jan. 27, 1953). Jean Allain argues that the intent of the 1956 Supplementary Convention was
to expand international law prohibitions to servitude. See generally Jean Allain, On the Curious
Disappearance of Human Servitude from General International Law, 11 J. HIST. INT’L L. 303 (2009). The
Secretary-General further enumerated evidence, or indicia, of the exercise of powers attaching to
ownership rights, including: making an individual of servile status the object of a purchase; using the
individual of servile status in an absolute manner without restriction unless expressly provided by law;
appropriating products of labor without compensation; transferring ownership from one person to
another; prohibiting the individual of servile status to terminate the status at will; and permitting the
transmission of servile status to descendants of the individual having such status. U.N. SecretaryGeneral, Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Other Forms of Servitude, ¶¶ 36–37, U.N. Doc. E/2357 (Jan. 27, 1953).
68. 1956 Supplementary Slavery Convention, supra note 61.
69. Article 3 reads:
(1) The act of conveying or attempting to convey slaves from one country to another
by whatever means of transport, or of being accessory …
(2)(a) The States Parties shall take all effective measures to prevent ships and aircraft
… from conveying slaves
(b) The States Parties shall take all effective measures to ensure that their ports,
airfields and coasts are not used for the conveyance of slaves.
Id. at art. 3.
70. Id. (emphasis added); JEAN ALLAIN, SLAVERY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: OF HUMAN
EXPLOITATION AND TRAFFICKING 95 (2012).
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African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights (ACHPR).71 The European
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) prohibits slavery, but not the slave
trade.72 Generally, the preparatory works of the regional instruments drew
upon the UDHR and ICCPR drafting, which reflected the prohibitions
defined under the 1926 Slavery Convention and 1956 Supplementary
Slavery Convention and remain authoritative in international law today.73

C. Normative Status in International Law
In addition to broad definitions and scope under international law that
cover all forms and manifestations of slavery and the slave trade, including
as international human rights violations, slavery and the slave trade also have
been endowed with a super-normative status under international law.
Slavery and the slave trade enjoy jus cogens status74 with state erga omnes
71. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 4 (Dec. 10, 1948); G.A.
Res. 2200A (XXI), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 8(1) (Dec. 16, 1966); Org.
of African Unity [OAU], African Charter on Human and People’s Rights, art. 5 (June 27, 1981); Org. of
American States [OAS], American Convention on Human Rights, art. 6 (Nov. 22, 1969). For an indepth look at the development of the prohibitions under the UDHR and ICCPR, see Kestenbaum,
supra note 25.
72. European Convention on Human Rights art. 4, Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S. 5. The European
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) prohibits slavery, servitude, and forced labor, but not the slave
trade. Id. The preparatory works of the ECHR demonstrate that the exclusion of the slave trade
prohibition was not debated and its omission, although intentional, was not understood as one limiting
the scope of protection of Article 4. The replication of the debate over the ICCPR drafting suggests
that the “traffic in human beings” and not the “slave trade as such” was the violation still occurring in
the eyes of the ECHR drafters, but that the ICCPR explicitly excluded “traffic in human beings,”
thereby relegating the slave trade prohibition as no longer necessary or relevant. See Eur. Consult. Ass.,
Travaux Preparatoires, at 15–16, DH(62)10, (Nov. 15, 1962), https://www.echr.coe.int/LibraryDocs/
Travaux/ECHRTravaux-ART4-DH(62)10-BIL1712017.PDF. In the preparatory works of the ACHR,
the representative from Guatemala suggested replacing the “slave trade” with “traffic in women.” In
the end, both prohibitions were included in Article 6, along with slavery and servitude. Org. of
American States [OAS], Conferencia Especializada Interamericana Sobre Derechos Humanos, Ser.k/XVI/1.2,
(Nov. 22, 1969), http://www.oas.org/es/cidh/mandato/Basicos/Actas-Conferencia-InteramericanaDerechos-Humanos-1969.pdf. The African Charter has incomplete and cursory travaux preparatoires.
See, e.g., Frans Viljoen, The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: The Travaux Préparatoires in the
Light of Subsequent Practice, 25 HUM. RTS. L.J. 315, 315–16, 325 (2004).
73. For an in-depth examination of the treaty drafting process of the ICCPR with regard to slavery
and the slave trade, see Kestenbaum, supra note 25, at 544-65.
74. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES § 702 cmts.
d-i, § 102 cmt. k (AM. L. INST. 1987); see also E.J. Criddle & E. Fox-Decent, A Fiduciary Theory of Jus
Cogens, 34 YALE J. INT’L L. 331, 331-87 (2009), http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjil/vol34/
iss2/3; M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Crimes: Jus Cogens and Obligatio Erga Omnes, 59 LAW AND
CONTEMP. PROBS. 63, 70-71 (1996), https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=
1016&context=lcp; see also JENNY S. MARTINEZ, THE SLAVE TRADE AND THE ORIGINS OF
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 12 (2012); see also TERJE EINARSEN, THE CONCEPT OF
UNIVERSAL CRIMES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 8 (2012), https://www.fichl.org/fileadmin/fichl/
documents/FICHL_14_Web.pdf; Documents of the second part of the seventeenth session and of the eighteenth
session including the reports of the Commission to the General Assembly, [1966] Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n, at 248,
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obligations.75 Norms that attain jus cogens status are peremptory norms in
international law—similar to the concept of strict liability in domestic law—
meaning that no justification exists to avoid state responsibility for a breach
of prohibitions of slavery or the slave trade.76 As jus cogens norms, slavery
and the slave trade require attendant erga omnes obligations of states, which
means “owed by everyone to all.”77 Thus, if breached, any state has a legal
interest and may invoke state responsibility of another state for violations
of slavery and slave trade prohibitions.78 Neither human trafficking nor
forced labor enjoys jus cogens status as a human rights violation, nor do states
have erga omnes obligations to remedy violations of human trafficking or
forced labor.
Adding to their peremptory status, slavery and the slave trade are core
international crimes,79 prohibitions and crimes under customary

U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1966/Add.1 (Vol. II). While no jus cogens norms are enumerated in Articles
53 or 64 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, International Law Commission drafters set
out “some of the most obvious and best settled rules of jus cogens” as being “trade in slaves, piracy or
genocide.” Id.
75. For an in-depth survey, see ALEXANDER ORAKHELASHVILI, PEREMPTORY NORMS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2008). The reverse is not necessarily true. See Conclusions of the Work of the Study
Group on the Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of
International Law, U.N. Doc. A/61/10 (2006), reprinted in [2006] Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SER.A/2006/Add.1 (Part 2). The ICJ explicitly has ruled that protection from slavery is an
erga omnes obligation of states under human rights law. Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co.,
Limited (Belg. v. Spain), Judgment, 1970 I.C.J. Rep. 3, 32 (Feb. 5). The other human right so identified
by the Court is freedom from racial discrimination. Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts, art. 42(b), U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001), reprinted in [2001] Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 (Part 2).
76. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties arts. 53, 64, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S 331;
Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 24, arts. 26, 40, 50. See Jean Allain, Slavery, in SLAVERY
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: OF HUMAN EXPLOITATION AND TRAFFICKING 110 (2012) (likening jus
cogens to the domestic law concept of strict liability).
77. See Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 24.
78. See id.; Dire Tladi (Special Rapporteur), Fifth Rep. on Peremptory Norms of General International
Law (jus cogens), 52, U.N. Doc. No. A/CN.4/747 (Jan. 24, 2022).
79. Rod Rastan, Complementarity: Contest or Collaboration?, in COMPLEMENTARITY AND THE
EXERCISE OF UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION FOR CORE INTERNATIONAL CRIMES 123 (Morten Bergsmo
ed., 2010), available at https://www.fichl.org/fileadmin/fichl/documents/FICHL_7_Web.pdf (last
visited Aug. 4, 2020).
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international law,80 and humanitarian law prohibitions.81 Under the Rome
Statute of the ICC, “enslavement”—defined as slavery, and including acts
of the slave trade as constituting evidence of exercising powers attaching to
ownership rights over persons—is a constituent crime of crimes against
humanity in international criminal law.82 Slavery and the slave trade could
also constitute acts of genocide83 and fundamental human rights violations
in cases of persecution.84
International law does not permit statutes of limitations for
80. Several 19th century anti-slave trade and slavery treaties recognized penal sanctions for slave
trading and slavery, such as the Congress of Vienna Act, The Treaty of London, The General Act of
Berlin, The Act of Brussels, The 1890 Treaty Between Great Britain and Spain for the Suppression of
the African Slave Trade, and the Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye. See, e.g., M. Cherif Bassiouni,
Enslavement as an International Crime, 23 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 445, 447-48, 456 (1991). But see Claus
Kreß, International Criminal Law, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW,
available at https://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690e1423?prd=EPIL (last visited Feb. 5, 2020). Nonetheless, the stricto sensu conditions for international
crimes are met for slavery and the slave trade: (1) provisions provide for international individual
criminal liability; (2) the norms against slavery and the slave trade have jus cogens status and, thus,
proscription exists in all forms, under any circumstances, and bars immunities; and (3) slavery and the
slave trade prohibitions could be enforced directly under international criminal jurisdiction, or
indirectly by a national court through international ius puniendi, exercised under universal jurisdiction.
See Sellers & Kestenbaum, supra note 8, 517-42 (regarding the slave trade).
81. General Orders No. 100 arts. 23, 42, 58, available at https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_
Law/Lieber_Collection/pdf/Instructions-gov-armies.pdf?loclr=bloglaw (last visited Jan. 7, 2020)
[hereinafter the Lieber Code]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) art. 4, June
8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609; The Commentary to Art. 4(2)(f) of the Additional Protocols emphasizes
that the prohibition of slavery and the slave trade are “universally accepted.” The phrase “in all their
forms” in relation to slavery and the slave trade should be understood within the meaning of the 1926
Slavery Convention and the 1956 Supplemental Slavery Convention. International Committee of the
Red Cross, Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), § 4541 (June 8, 1977)
Commentary of 1987, available at https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Comment.xsp?
action=openDocument&documentId=5CBB47A6753A2B77C12563CD0043A10B (last visited Sept.
27, 2019).
82. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 7(2)(c), July 1, 2002, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90.
“‘Enslavement’ means the exercise of any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership over
a person and includes the exercise of such power in the course of trafficking in persons, in particular
women and children.” Id. “Sexual slavery” is also enumerated as a separate crime. See infra Part III for
a discussion of the limitations of this separate enumeration. The slave trade is not enumerated or
defined within the Rome Statute of the ICC. For an in-depth discussion as to the problems that this
omission poses for international law, as well as justice and accountability for victims, see Sellers &
Kestenbaum, supra note 8, at 517-42. Notably, these crimes are replicated verbatim in the draft Crimes
Against Humanity treaty, now stalled in the UN General Assembly’s Sixth Committee (Legal).
83. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide art. II, Dec. 9,
1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277.
84. Lisa Davis, Dusting off the Law Books: Recognizing Gender Persecution in Conflicts and Atrocities, 20
NW. J. HUM. RTS. 1, 5-6, 39-40 (2021). German Court Convicts a Third ISIS Member of Crimes Against
Humanity Committed Against Yazidis, DOUGHTY STREET CHAMBERS (June 18, 2021), https://
www.doughtystreet.co.uk/news/german-court-convicts-third-isis-member-crimes-against-humanitycommitted-against-yazidis; German Court Hands Down a Fourth Conviction for Crimes Against Humanity
Committed by ISIS Against the Yazidis, DOUGHTY STREET CHAMBERS (July 26, 2021), (German cases
convicting ISIS members of crimes against humanity, including aiding and abetting enslavement).
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international crimes85 and jus cogens norms;86 thus, slavery and the slave trade
can be prosecuted and otherwise remedied at any time, and a state’s failure
to provide redress for international crimes is an ongoing human rights
violation.87 Slavery and the slave trade crimes also can be adjudicated under
the principle of universal jurisdiction, meaning that domestic courts with
such powers could try such crimes based on the gravity of the offense, even
when no other basis for jurisdiction (i.e., territory, nationality, etc.) exists.88
Further, slavery and slave trade prohibitions are non-derogable human
rights.89 The ICCPR’s article 4(1) permits states to derogate from treaty
obligations in times of “public emergency”; however, article 4(2) designates
certain rights—including slavery and the slave trade prohibitions under
article 8(1)—as exempt from suspension at any time, even in times of public
emergency.90 While human trafficking is prohibited as a human rights
85. See, e.g., Almonacid-Arellano v. Chile, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs,
Judgement, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 153, 154 (Sept. 26, 2006); Org. of Am. States, InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights [IACHR], Statement on the Duty of the Haitian State to Investigate
the Gross Violations of Human Rights Committed During the Regime of Jean-Claude Duvalier, §§ 11-4, 39 (May
17, 2011) http://www.cidh.oas.org/pronunciamientocidhhaitimayo2011.en.htm. See also M. CHERIF
BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: HISTORICAL EVOLUTION AND CONTEMPORARY
APPLICATION 279 (2011); PRINCETON UNIV. PROGRAM IN LAW & PUB. AFFAIRS, THE PRINCETON
PRINCIPLES ON UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION 31 (2000) (principle 6); Jan Arno Hessbruegge, Justice
Delayed, Not Denied: Statutory Limitations and Human Rights Crimes, 43 GEO. J. INT’L L. 335, 348 (2012);
Roberto Belelli, The Establishment of the System of International Criminal Justice, in INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL JUSTICE: LAW AND PRACTICE FROM THE ROME STATUTE TO ITS REVIEW 5, 42 (Roberto
Belelli ed., 2010); ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 319 (2003) (regarding war
crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide); William A. Schabas, Article 29, in COMMENTARY ON
THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 848 (Otto Triffterer ed., 2008);
Christine Van den Wyngaert & John Dugard, Non-Applicability of Statute of Limitations, in THE ROME
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 873, 887 (Antonio Cassese
et al. eds., 2002); Gay McDougall (Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Slavery), Systematic
Rape, Sexual Slavery and Slavery-like Practices During Armed Conflict, 90, U.N. Econ. and Soc. Council,
Comm’n on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1998/13 (June 22, 1998) (finding an
“internationally accepted principle that there are no statute of limitations barriers to the prosecution
and compensation of serious violations of human rights and humanitarian law”).
86. Prosecutor v. Furundija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, ¶ 156 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Dec. 10, 1998); Prosecutor v. Kallon, SCSL-2004-15AR72(E), SCSL-200416AR72(E), 1, 84, 85, 88 (Special Court for Sierra Leone Mar. 13, 2004); see also Barrios Altos v. Peru,
Merits, Judgement, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 75, 41 (Mar. 14, 2001); U.N. High Commissioner
for Human Rights, Rule-of-Law Tools for Post-Conflict States: Amnesties, 29, HR/PUB/09/1 (2009);
ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 312-16 (2003). But see Elizabeth B. Ludwin
King, Amnesties in a Time of Transition, 41 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 577, 583 (2011).
87. See Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 24, art. 14. Rep. of the Human Rights
Committee, U.N. Doc. A/36/40 (1981), at 172, ¶¶ 10–11 (1981).
88. Rastan, Complementarity: Contest or Collaboration?, supra note 79, at 265; M. Cherif Bassiouni, The
History of Universal Jurisdiction and Its Place in International Law, in UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: NATIONAL
COURTS AND THE PROSECUTION OF SERIOUS CRIMES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 48, 49, 62
(Stephen Macedo ed., 2004).
89. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 4 (Dec. 10, 1948);
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 8, Dec. 16, 1966, T.I.A.S. No. 92-908, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR].
90. ICCPR, supra note 89, art. 4(1-2).
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violation against women under the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW),91 against children
under the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC),92 and forced labor
is prohibited under the ICCPR’s article 8(3) and International Labour
Organization (ILO) Convention No. 29,93 these prohibitions have not been
declared non-derogable international human rights.
These international legal obligations give rise to state responsibility for
violations of slavery and the slave trade prohibitions as international
wrongful acts. The International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on State
Responsibility for International Wrongful Acts include human rights
obligations and do not permit under any circumstances states to abrogate
responsibility with regard to breaches of peremptory (jus cogens) norms.94
When states are in breach of international law obligations, responsibilities
include: ceasing the wrongful acts (or omissions), offering guarantees of
non-repetition, and providing full reparation for the injury.95 Slavery and the
slave trade prohibitions are among these rights that give rise to international
law obligations of all states whether or not they have signed a treaty to
respect and “ensure respect”—meaning whether or not state or private
actors engage in slavery or slave trade violations96—for such rights of
individuals within their borders.
Finally, while not settled law, compelling arguments exist that
international state responsibility to other states for violations of slavery or
the slave trade prohibitions attaches the moment that slavery or the slave
trade has been found to have been perpetrated within the offending state’s
borders—regardless of whether the state is implicated in the wrongful acts
91. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women art. 6, Dec.
18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 (“States Parties shall take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to
suppress all forms of traffic in women and exploitation of prostitution of women.”).
92. Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 34 (sexual exploitation), 35 (abduction, sale or
traffic), 36 (all other forms of exploitation), Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3.
93. Convention concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour (ILO No. 29), adopted June 28, 1930,
39 U.N.T.S. 55 (entered into force May 1, 1932); ICCPR, supra note 89, art. 8(3).
94. Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 24, arts. 26, 28 (“Article 28 does not exclude
the possibility that an internationally wrongful act may involve legal consequences in the relations
between the State responsible for that act and persons or entities other than States. This follows from
article 1, which covers all international obligations of the State and not only those owed to other States.
Thus, State responsibility extends, for example, to human rights violations and other breaches of
international law where the primary beneficiary of the obligation breached is not a State.”).
95. Id. arts. 30, 31.
96. Under the principle of international law to respect and ensure respect for jus cogens rights, not
only must the state directly affected by a violation take measures to stop it, but all other states must
take measures to stop the violations as well. See, e.g., concept of injured State adopted by the
International Law Commission in Art. 42 of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility. Draft Articles
on State Responsibility, supra note 24, arts. 42, 48; Conference of States Parties to the Fourth Geneva
Convention, experts’ meeting on the Fourth Geneva Convention, Chairman’s Report, Experts’ Meeting
(Oct. 27-29, 1998).
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and regardless of whether the state has prohibited slavery and the slave trade
at the domestic level—so long as the state has failed to act with due diligence
to investigate, prosecute, and punish the perpetrators.97 Thus, the state
obligation to the international community is to never under any
circumstances commit, be complicit in the commission of, or permit private
actors to commit with impunity an act of slavery or the slave trade within
its borders; if and when such perpetration is found, the state is fully
responsible for the cessation and guarantee of non-repetition of the acts, as
well as the redress to victims of slavery and slave trade harms, including
through investigation, prosecution, and punishment of perpetrators.98 The
United Nations International Law Commission has found that, in cases of
“serious breaches”—meaning gross or systematic failures—of peremptory,
jus cogens norms of international law, all states must cooperate through lawful
means to bring an end to the breach.99 In practical terms, however, state
responsibility for breaches and serious breaches of slavery and slave trade
prohibitions still remains subject to jurisdictional limitations and
enforcement challenges that exist in international law more generally.100
97. See Lorna McGregor, State Immunity and Jus Cogens, 55 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 437, 437 (2006)
(finding the issue to be an evolving area of international law in a state of flux). For example, some
courts have found that states waive sovereign immunity in the case of violations of jus cogens norms.
Areios Pagos [A.P.] [Supreme Court] 11/2000, p. 514 (Greece) (allegations of forced labor); Bernard
H. Oxman, Maria Gavouneli & Ilias Banterkas, Sovereign Immunity-Tort Exception-Jus Cogens ViolationsWorld War II Reparations-International Humanitarian Law, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 198, 200-01 (2001) (translating
the judgment of the Court). Others have permitted sovereign immunity claims to prevail. See Al-Adsani
v. Kuwait [1996] AC, [1998] 107 I.L.R. 536 (English Court of Appeal upheld the plea of immunity
when allegations included torture); Bouzari v. Iran, [2004] 71 O.R. 3d 675 (Can. Ont. C.A.) (Ontario
Court of Appeal granted the Islamic Republic of Iran immunity when allegations included torture).
The Committee against Torture subsequently made clear in its consideration of Canada’s State party
report that its failure to provide a civil remedy to all victims of torture do not comport with its
obligations under the Convention against Torture. U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., 646th mtg. at 11-12,
CAT/C/SR.646 (May 6, 2005). See also Anthony J. Colangelo, Jurisdiction, Immunity, Legality, and Jus
Cogens, 14 CHI. INT’L L.J. 53, 61 (2013) (finding that immunities are jurisdictional barriers but do not
determine the legality of the underlying conduct). See, e.g., Jurisdictional Immunities of the State, (Ger.
v. It: Greece intervening), Judgment, 2012 I.C.J. 38, 93 (Feb. 3,); Thomas Weatherall, Jus Cogens and
Sovereign Immunity: Reconciling Divergence in Contemporary Jurisprudence, 46 GEO. J. INT’L L. 1151, 1151-53
(2015). This inquiry into what exactly constitutes a breach and what the legal limits are to state
responsibility vis a vis jus cogens norms is the subject of my current research and will be discussed in detail
in a future publication.
98. State responsibility to other states is without prejudice to obligations to victims. See G.A. Res.
60/147, Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross
Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian
Law, ¶ 7 (Dec. 16, 2005).
99. Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 24, art. 41(1); Int’l L. Comm’n, Rep. on the
Wrk of its Seventy-First Session, U.N. Doc. No. A/74/10, at 145-50 (Aug. 20, 2019).
100. See, e.g., Anthony J. Colangelo, Jurisdiction, Immunity, Legality, and Jus Cogens, 14 CHI. INT’L
L.J. 53, 61 (2013). For example, universal jurisdiction permits but does not require, states to apply
substantive international law to particularly grave offenses, including slavery. A state would have to
exercise prescriptive jurisdiction in order to then exercise universal jurisdiction to enforce against
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II. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW COMMITMENT AND
COMPLIANCE WITH SLAVERY AND SLAVE TRADE PROHIBITIONS
Most international lawyers assume that international law matters.101 In
recent decades, international law scholars increasingly have questioned and
some have empirically tested this assumption102 alongside international
relations scholars who have long debated conceptions of and compliance
slavery and slave trade violations. See Anthony J. Colangelo, The Legal Limits of Universal Jurisdiction, 47
VA. J. INT’L L. 149, 186-98 (2006) (appendix detailing universal jurisdiction offenses under international
law). However, the Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for
Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of
International Humanitarian Law requires states to implement appropriate provisions for universal
jurisdiction. G.A. Res. 60/147, supra note 98, ¶ 5.
101. See, e.g., LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY 46-48 (2d.
ed. 1979) (arguing that nearly all nation states observe nearly all norms of international law and nearly
all obligations under international law nearly all of the time.); ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER
CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY
AGREEMENTS (1995); Andrew T. Guzman, International Law: A Compliance-Based Theory, 90 CAL. L. REV.
1823 (2002); Arlene S. Kanter, Do Human Rights Treaties Matter: The Case for the United Nations Convention
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 52 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L. L. 577 (2019); Abram Chayes & Antonia
Handler Chayes, On Compliance, 47 INT’L ORG. 175, 176 (1993); Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations
Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599, 2599-2600 (1997) (book review). But see Benedict
Kingsbury, The Concept of Compliance as a Function of Competing Conceptions of International Law, 19 MICH. J.
INT’L L. 345, 346 (1998) (pointing out that empirical data are lacking to determine whether states obey
international law).
102. See, e.g., ERIC POSNER, THE TWILIGHT OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (2014) (arguing that the
continued existence of human rights violations globally constitutes sufficient evidence that human
rights law has not worked and should be abandoned); SAMUEL MOYN, HUMAN RIGHTS IN AN
UNEQUAL WORLD (Harvard Univ. Press, 2018); MAKAU MUTUA, HUMAN RIGHTS: A POLITICAL AND
CULTURAL CRITIQUE (Univ. of Pennsylvania Press, 2008) (finding that human rights do not work
because they have not resulted in greater economic opportunities globally); Ingrid B. Wuerth,
International Law in the Post-Human Rights Era, 96 TEX. L. REV. 279, 284 (2017); Samuel Moyn, A Powerless
Companion: Human Rights in the Age of Neoliberalism, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147, 150 (2014); Eric
Posner, Have Human Rights Treaties Failed? Human Rights Law is Too Ambitious and Ambiguous, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 28, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2014/12/28/have-human-rights-treatiesfailed; Eric Posner, The case against human rights, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 4, 2014), https://www.
theguardian.com/news/2014/dec/04/-sp-case-against-human-rights; Francis A. Boyle, The Irrelevance
of International Law: The Schism Between International Law and International Politics, 10 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 193
(1980) (finding international law to be unimportant in international relations); Robert H. Bork, The
Limits of International Law, NAT’L INT., Winter 1989-1990, at 3; Cf. Oona Hathaway, Do Human Rights
Treaties Make a Difference?, 111 YALE L.J. 1935, 1937 (2002); Douglass Cassel, Does International Human
Rights Law Make a Difference?, 2 CHI. J. INT’L L. 121 (2001); Douglass Cassel, Inter-American Human Rights
Law, Soft and Hard, in COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE: THE ROLE OF NONBINDING NORMS IN
THE INTERNATIONAL LAW SYSTEM 393 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2000); Kenneth W. Abbott, Modern
International Relations Theory: A Prospectus for International Lawyers, 14 YALE INT’L L.J. 335 (1989); Kenneth
W. Abbott, International Relations Theory, International Law, and the Regime Governing Atrocities in Internal
Conflicts, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 361 (1999); Anne-Marie Slaughter et al., International Law and International
Relations Theory: A New Generation of Interdisciplinary Scholarship, 92 AM. J. INT’L L. 367 (1998); Robert O.
Keohane, International Relations and International Law: Two Optics, 38 HARV. INT’L L.J. 487 (1997); John
K. Setear, An Iterative Perspective on Treaties: A Synthesis of International Relations Theory and International Law,
37 HARV. INT’L L.J. 139 (1996); Beth A. Simmons, Compliance with International Agreements, 1 ANN. REV.
POL. SCI. 75 (1998); MICHAEL BYERS, THE ROLE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (Michael
Byers ed., 2000).
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with international law.103 When it comes to international human rights law
compliance, scholars, such as Beth Simmons,104 Kathryn Sikkink,105 and
others,106 rightly have moved the conversation beyond (often symbolic)107
ratification of human rights treaties to include the movements and
normative processes of human rights law and practice over time. This
theoretical discussion is especially important for slavery and slave trade
prohibitions because these norms have attained customary international law
status—state practice accepted out of a sense of legal obligation whether or
not enumerated explicitly in a treaty that has the same force of law as a treaty
obligation—thus, treaty ratification is not necessary to claim commitment
or obligation of states.108
As Simmons would argue, the question to ask is not whether states who
ratify human rights treaties then comply with human rights obligations, but
rather, “what and how has [a specific treaty or instrument] contributed to . . .
103. See, e.g., MICHAEL BYERS, CUSTOM, POWER, AND THE POWER OF RULES: INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS AND CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 9 (1999) (discussing international law as
dependent upon power and having little relationship to how states behave); George W. Downs et al.,
Is the Good News About Compliance Good News About Cooperation?, 50 INT’L ORG. 379 (1996) (discussing
the relationship between compliance and international cooperation among states); Beth A. Simmons,
Money and the Law: Why Comply with Public International Law of Money?, 25 YALE J. INT’L L. 323, 323-24
(2000) (“[M]ost legal scholars and practitioners believe that the rules at the center of their analysis do
indeed matter . . . Scholars of international relations . . . have been far more skeptical.”); See also A.W.
BRIAN SIMPSON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE END OF EMPIRE (Oxford Univ. Press, 2001) (examining
through case studies the relationship between treaty ratification and state behavior).
104. BETH SIMMONS, MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN DOMESTIC
POLITICS 317-35 (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2009).
105. KATHRYN SIKKINK, EVIDENCE FOR HOPE: MAKING HUMAN RIGHTS WORK FOR THE
21ST CENTURY 20 (2017).
106. See, e.g., Grainne de Burca, Human Rights Experimentalism, 111 AM. J. INT’L L. 277 (2017)
(examining human rights law through a theory of experimentalist governance); Eric Neumayer, Do
International Human Rights Treaties Improve Respect for Human Rights?, 49 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 925 (2005)
(discussing the relationship between ratification of human rights treaties and compliance with treaty
norms).
107. Arlene S. Kanter, Do Human Rights Treaties Matter: The Case for the United Nations Convention on
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 52 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 577, 585 (2019); Joshua Keating, Why
Countries Make Human Rights Pledges They Have No Intention of Honoring, SLATE (Oct. 21, 2014, 3:13 PM),
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2014/10/why-countries-make-human-rights-pledges-theyhave-no-intention-of-honoring.html; see also Benjamin Mason Meier & Jocelyn Getgen, Ratification of
Human Rights Treaties: The Beginning not the End, 374 LANCET 447, 447 (2009).
108. Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co., Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain), Judgment, 1970 I.C.J. 3, ¶¶ 3334 (Feb. 5). The International Court of Justice stated in Barcelona Traction:
In view of the importance of the rights involved, all States can be held to have a legal interest
in their protection; they are obligations erga omnes. Such obligations derive, for example, in
contemporary international law, from the outlawing of acts of aggression, and of genocide,
[and] also from the principles and rules the basic human rights of the human person,
including protection from slavery and racial discrimination. Some of the corresponding
rights of protection have entered into the body of general international law; ... others are
conferred by international instruments of a universal or quasi-universal character.
Id.
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[enjoyment of] rights more fully than would have been the case in the
absence of the major human rights treaties.”109 The international legal
structure, and specifically treaties to which states have voluntarily
committed themselves, therefore, are the “hooks” by which victims of rights
violations and their allies can call on governments to change policy and
practice.110 As Robert Keohane has stated: regimes focus actors’
expectations;111 treaties, therefore, constrain states because they define the
expectations gap and signal when governments do not comply fully with their
human rights obligations.112 Additionally, treaties that reflect or influence
the development of customary international law norms expand the notion
beyond commitment to treaties toward commitment to the norms
themselves, irrespective of treaty ratification.
Many scholars rightly caution against too much faith in the
emancipatory potential of international human rights law. Maxwell
Chibundu, for instance, recognizes that human rights claims, especially in
their domestic application, are susceptible to institutional and interest group
capture.113 Professor David Kennedy finds that human rights law tends to
overpromise and underdeliver on its aspirational goals.114 Most relevant to
this discussion, Professor Karen Engle has offered that human rights law in
its legal liberalist implementation—using Bush administration justifications
for invading Afghanistan and decoupling anti-trafficking advocacy from sex
workers’ rights as examples—can detract attention from policy problems
that oppressed peoples face toward policy interventions that benefit the
politically powerful.115 Other scholarship critiques the global human rights
movement as imperialist in nature.116 Critical feminist scholars problematize
human rights as reifying patriarchal structures, including by an overemphasis
on state actors.117

109. BETH SIMMONS, MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN DOMESTIC
POLITICS 350 (2009) (emphasis in original).
110. See id. at 6.
111. ROBERT KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE WORLD
POLITICAL ECONOMY 49-64 (1984); SIMMONS, supra note 109, 104.
112. KEOHANE at 49-64.
113. Maxwell O. Chibundu, Making Customary International Law Through Municipal Adjudication: A
Structural Inquiry, 39 VA. J. INT’L L. 1069, 1073 (1999).
114. DAVID KENNEDY, THE DARK SIDES OF VIRTUE: REASSESSING INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIANISM (2004) (arguing that human rights are aspirational and lack effectiveness as an
approach to complex global problem-solving).
115. Karen Engle, Liberal Internationalism, Feminism, and the Suppression of the Critique: Contemporary
Approaches to Global Order in the United States, 46 HARV. INT’L L.J. 427, 427-41 (2005).
116. Makau Wa. Mutua, Savages, Victims and Saviors: The Metaphor of Human Rights, 42 HARV. INT’L
L.J. 201-46 (2001); ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MAKING OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005) (connecting international law and Western imperialism).
117. Frances Olsen, Children’s Rights: Some Feminist Approaches to the United Nations Convention on
the Rights of the Child, in CHILDREN, RIGHTS AND THE LAW 192-220 (Phillip Alston et al. eds., 1992).
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While critical lenses are essential to human rights scholarship and
practice, and while all of these critiques are valid with respect to various
aspects of human rights, there remains a crucial place for international
human rights law and advocacy toward improving human dignity and
substantive improvements in rights conditions on the ground. Simmons
provides a theoretical basis for stakeholders to utilize treaty provisions to
improve human rights practice and state compliance.118 She argues for a
domestic politics theory of compliance; in other words, human rights treaty
obligations alter the political calculus of domestic actors in several ways.119
First, international treaty obligations can influence national political
agendas.120 Second, treaty commitments can spur human rights (strategic)
litigation121 at the domestic and international levels.122 Third, attention to
treaty norms can mobilize social movements and legitimate group demands
for domestic law and policy change by increasing the value of the right as
well as the chances for successful outcomes.123 Simmons examines not only
treaty ratification, but also subsequent legal commitments, such as protocols
that permit individual human rights complaints124 and expose states to
greater international scrutiny.125 Other scholars, such as Sally Engle Merry,
examine legal literacy and its potential indirect effects on compliance with
human rights norms.126 The bottom line is that meaningful change through

118. See SIMMONS, supra note 109.
119. See id.
120. See id.
121. For an excellent review of human rights strategic litigation, see HELEN DUFFY, STRATEGIC
HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION: UNDERSTANDING AND MAXIMIZING IMPACT (2018). For scholars
finding little to no impact of strategic litigation or “cause lawyering,” see GERALD N. ROSENBERG,
THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991); Gerald N. Rosenberg,
Hollow Hopes and Other Aspirations: A Reply to Feely and McCain, 17 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 761-68 (1992);
Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Elites, Social Movements and the Law: The Case of Affirmative Action, 105 COLUM. L.
REV. 1436, 1436-1528 (2005).
122. See SIMMONS, supra note 109 (cautioning, however, that the existence of a legal tool does not
guarantee its use or fair use); see generally Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100
YALE L.J. 2347 (1991). Such litigation can instigate transjudicial dialogue. See, e.g., Anne-Marie
Slaughter, A Typology of Transjudicial Communication, 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 99, 99-101 (1994). In the case
of slavery and slave trade prohibitions, the existence of a legal tool does not guarantee its use or
competent use. In fact, the slave trade is completely misunderstood as a separate prohibition under
international law.
123. See SIMMONS, supra note 109.
124. For instance, the Human Rights Committee (HRC) monitors state compliance with the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and, under the ICCPR’s Optional
Protocol I, states agree to allowing the HRC to hear individual human rights complaints called
“communications” that allege state violations of treaty provisions and determine state responsibility.
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999 U.N.T.S. 302
(entered into force 23 March 1976).
125. SIMMONS, supra note 109.
126. SALLY ENGLE MERRY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND GENDER VIOLENCE: TRANSLATING
INTERNATIONAL LAW INTO LOCAL JUSTICE 167, 177-202 (2006).
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human rights treaty commitment and compliance happens, and it happens
most effectively and meaningfully at the domestic, grassroots levels.
Translating international human rights law to domestic state compliance
may also require a change in perceptions and understandings of deeply held
beliefs, interests, and identities.127 Compliance may depend on evolving
understandings of state sovereignty and what it means to exercise state
sovereignty.128 In this way, human rights treaty language can serve to shape
and change political discourse and struggle,129 adding new ways of viewing
rights holders’ relationships to the state and to one another.130 Merry
describes goals of translating human rights norms “into the vernacular” as
taking global principles and connecting them to everyday life as it is
experienced in particular contexts.131 This translation is increasingly
multidirectional and iterative as groups—especially historically marginalized
identity groups, such as Indigenous peoples and LGBTQIA+ people—
demand rights and (rights as) remedies on the international stage.132
Even if commitment and compliance matter in human rights law
generally, the case must still be made that a recommitment to slavery and
the slave trade prohibitions matter under human rights law. What role do
these “super norms” continue to play toward eradicating systems of slavery
and the slave trade, as well as to provide remedies for slavery and slave trade
harms?
First, as explained supra, de facto slavery and the slave trades that support
such slavery conditions persist globally; thus, human rights law continues to
play an important role in abolishing these harms. Today, however, slavery
prohibitions rarely are enforced and the slave trade remains completely
absent from human rights treaty implementation and enforcement.133 The
127. See PATRICIA EWICK & SUSAN S. SILBEY, THE COMMON PLACE OF LAW: STORIES FROM
EVERYDAY LIFE, LANGUAGE AND LEGAL DISCOURSE 43 (1998).
128. See, e.g., M. Shah Alam, Enforcement of International Human Rights Law by Domestic Courts: A
Theoretical and Practical Study, 53 NETH. INT’L L. REV. 399, 399-438 (2006) (finding that, while states
often cling to sovereignty claims to reject direct application of human rights treaties in domestic courts,
the act of engaging in treaty making is an exercise of sovereignty).
129. See Alan Hunt, Rights and Social Movements: Counter-Hegemonic Strategies, 17 J. LAW & SOCIETY
309, 309-28 (1990).
130. SIMMONS, supra note 109, at 141. See also CAMBRIDGE UNIV. PRESS, THE POLITICS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (Christian Reus-Smit ed., 2004); RUTI G. TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE
(2000) (discussing the importance of these relationships for transitional societies).
131. See generally MERRY, supra note 126 (uncovering the tensions between international law at the
global level and its implementation and realization at the local levels); see also Sally Engle Merry, Peggy
Levitt, Mihaela Çerban Rosen & Diana H. Yoon, Law from Below: Women’s Human Rights and Social
Movements in New York City, 44 L. & SOC’Y REV. 101 (2010) (discussing a specific case study of human
rights realization in New York City).
132. See, e.g., Grainne de Burca, Human Rights Experimentalism, 111 AM. J. INT’L L. 277, 281 (2017).
133. But see a few regional human rights cases that adjudicate slavery but not the slave trade as
human rights violations, albeit incorrectly conflating trafficking with slavery. See infra Part III, at 36-38.
For an in-depth exploration of the HRC and ICCPR, see Kestenbaum, supra note 25, at 515.
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focus has moved away from human rights prohibitions on slavery and the
slave trade to focus on prosecuting enslavement and sexual slavery (but not
the slave trade) under international criminal law (and mostly focused on
conflict-related slavery crimes in states subject to the jurisdiction of the
ICC),134 human trafficking prosecutions under transnational criminal law,135
and, to a lesser extent, bringing individual claims for violations of human
trafficking prohibitions and slavery under human rights law.136 While this
inability to focus on monitoring human rights compliance with prohibitions
of slavery and the slave trade may have stalled efforts to combat de facto
practices of slavery and slave trade where they exist today, the diversion also
has led to this inflection point, pushing conversations among human
trafficking scholars and slavery and slave trade scholars to turn to the
emancipatory potential of international human rights law despite the
framework’s own limitations and flaws.
Under the Draft Articles on State Responsibility, states are required not
only to respect, but also to ensure respect, for human rights within their
borders.137 This means that the state itself through its officials must not only
refrain from committing slavery or slave trade acts, but it must also ensure
that private actors are not enslaving or slave trading individuals within their
borders. Slavery and slave trade practices, however, may offer benefits in
supply chains and international markets (i.e., free labor and cheaper goods);
thus, focusing more on the application of normative and expressive
theoretical models of compliance may assist in overcoming compliance
challenges in human rights enforcement in this area.
In the case of slavery and the slave trade, more emphasis on the state
responsibility of the international community of states (i.e., states that are
willing and able to bring violating states to account) to ensure that violating
states are held responsible for their internationally wrongful acts is critical.
Strong civil society actors pushing for full expressive accountability are
necessary to shift the calculations of all states presently acting in self-interest
and perpetuating slavery and slave trade harms.
Second, human rights law matters for slavery and the slave trade because
the international criminal law regime was not designed and, thus, is not
134. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Ongwen, ICC-02/04-01/15, Judgment (Feb. 4, 2021); Prosecutor v.
Ntaganda, ICC-01/04-02/06-2359, Judgment (July 8, 2019). For an in-depth look at the limitations of
enslavement and sexual slavery crimes under the ICC, see Patricia Viseur Sellers & Jocelyn Getgen
Kestenbaum, Conflict-Related Sexual Violence Symposium: Conversations under the Rome Statute—Enslavement
and Sexual Slavery, OPINIO JURIS (June 11, 2021).
135. See Paulette Lloyd & Beth A. Simmons, Framing for a New Transnational Legal Order: The Case
of Human Trafficking, in TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS 401 (Terence C. Halliday & Gregory Shaffer
eds., 2015).
136. Janie Chuang, Exploitation Creep and the Unmaking of Human Trafficking Law, 108 AM. J. INT’L
L. 609, 609-49 (2014).
137. Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 24.
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equipped to provide complete accountability or full expressive justice for
survivors of slavery and the slave trade. International criminal law concerns
itself with individual criminal liability, while international human rights law
centers on state responsibility and survivor redress/reparations for harms
endured as a result of such state failures to comply with treaty obligations.
In addition, the permanent international criminal court, the ICC, does not
have jurisdiction over all slavery and slave trade harms protected under
customary international law; thus, domestic and universal jurisdiction, as
well as human rights law, still must fill gaps in accountability.138 Further, as
will be explained in Part III infra, the international criminal law treaty regime
is structurally limited as compared to customary international law, thereby
offering fewer avenues for expressive justice for survivors of slavery and
especially slave trade crimes under the ICC.139 While customary
international law provides the same broad protections as does human rights
law, the focus of international criminal law has been on strengthening the
ICC and, thus, the cases addressing slavery crimes have yielded limited,
reductive, and legally untenable results.140
Human trafficking scholars have argued that domestic and transnational
criminal legal responses winning out over international human rights
prohibitions’ enforcement has positioned advocacy not toward victimcentered responses but toward plucking out bad actors while maintaining
the structures that perpetuate exploitation.141 Others, including Janie
138. For example, the International Criminal Court is not an option for individual criminal
accountability for the slave trade as it is not enumerated in the Rome Statute. See Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court, July 1, 2002, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90. For an analysis of general concerns on
outsized focus on international criminal law, see James J. Silk, International Criminal Justice and the Protection
of Human Rights: The Rule of Law or the Hubris of Law?, 39 YALE J. INT’L L. ONLINE 94, 102 (2014).
139. For a detailed analysis on the “missing” crimes of the slave trade under the Rome Statute,
see Sellers & Kestenbaum, supra note 8, at 517-42.
140. See Prosecutor v. Ongwen, ICC-02/04-01/15, Trial Judgment, ¶ 67 (Feb. 4, 2021),
https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2021_01026.PDF; Patricia Viseur Sellers & Jocelyn
Getgen Kestenbaum, Conflict-Related Sexual Violence Symposium: Conversations under the Rome Statute–
Enslavement and Slave Trade, OPINIO JURIS (June 11, 2021), http://opiniojuris.org/2021/06/11/conflict
-related-sexual-violence-conversations-under-the-rome-statute-enslavement-and-slave-trade/; Jocelyn
Getgen Kestenbaum & Magali Maystre, Symposium in Pursuit of Intersectional Justice at the International
Criminal Court: Group One–Sexual Slavery is Enslavement, OPINIO JURIS (May 2, 2022), http
://opiniojuris.org/2022/05/02/symposium-in-pursuit-of-intersectional-justice-at-the-internationalcriminal-court-group-one-sexual-slavery-is-enslavement.
141. See, e.g., Julia O’Connell Davidson, The Right to Locomotion? Trafficking, Slavery and the State, in
REVISITING THE LAW AND GOVERNANCE OF TRAFFICKING, FORCED LABOR AND MODERN
SLAVERY 157-78 (Prabha Kotiswaran ed., 2017); Chantal Thomas, Immigration Controls and “Modern-Day
Slavery,” in REVISITING THE LAW AND GOVERNANCE OF TRAFFICKING, FORCED LABOR AND
MODERN SLAVERY 212-37 (Prabha Kotiswaran ed., 2017); Janet Halley, Anti-Trafficking and the New
Indenture, in REVISITING THE LAW AND GOVERNANCE OF TRAFFICKING, FORCED LABOR AND
MODERN SLAVERY 179-211 (Prabha Kotiswaran ed., 2017); Kerry Rittich, Representing, Counting,
Valuing: Managing Definitional Uncertainty in the Law of Trafficking, in REVISITING THE LAW AND
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Chuang, argue that expansionist views of human trafficking under
international law have made trafficking prosecutions and civil suits for
damages more difficult; at the same time, the conflation with slavery (i.e.,
modern slavery rhetoric) has moved the trafficking conversation away from
sexual exploitation only toward important confrontations about global
economic organizational and structural factors of exploitative labor
practices more generally and toward exploring alternative responses to the
criminal legal paradigm that has “long dominated anti-trafficking law and
policy.”142 Both of these camps are correct, and similar attention to
enslavement and sexual slavery under international criminal law—which
exposes the Rome Statute’s structural limitations—has led to similar
confrontations about the boundaries of the international and domestic
criminal justice projects to combat slavery and especially the slave trade
harms that nearly always precede slavery.143
In addition to concerning itself with individual criminal liability and not
with state accountability/responsibility, international criminal justice serves
different expressive functions than does human rights in international law.
Several scholars have employed expressivist theories, concerned with the
way that social practices carry meaning and transmit messages apart from
their consequences,144 to justify, analyze, and critique international criminal
justice and international criminal courts.145 For instance, some expressivist
scholars focus on the punishment of perpetrators as deterring future
international criminals by expressing the international community’s moral
condemnation, establishing collective memory, or reinstating global

GOVERNANCE OF TRAFFICKING, FORCED LABOR AND MODERN SLAVERY 238-72 (Prabha
Kotiswaran ed., 2017); Joel Quirk & Julia O’Connell Davidson, Introduction and The Rhetoric and Reality
of ‘Ending Slavery in Our Lifetime,’ in POPULAR AND POLITICAL REPRESENTATIONS 16, 20-25 (Joel Quirk
& Julia O’Connell Davidson eds., 2016) (ebook). For an account that describes the human rights
concerns not as central, but rather as an impetus—or possibly even cover—for collective action to
address trafficking and smuggling, see Gallagher, supra note 50, at 976.
142. Janie A. Chuang, Contemporary Debt Bondage, “Self-Exploitation,” and the Limits of the Trafficking
Definition, in REVISITING THE LAW AND GOVERNANCE OF TRAFFICKING, FORCED LABOR AND
MODERN SLAVERY 112-13 (Prabha Kotiswaran ed., 2017).
143. Most scholars and practitioners consider human trafficking and slavery along a continuum
of exploitation, with trafficking somewhere in the middle and slavery being on the extreme; to me, this
understanding, while useful rhetorically, is not reflective of their definitional differences in kind under
law. Janie A. Chuang, Contemporary Debt Bondage, “Self-Exploitation” and the Limits of the Trafficking
Definition, in REVISITING THE LAW AND GOVERNANCE OF TRAFFICKING, FORCED LABOR AND
MODERN SLAVERY 122 (Prabha Kotiswaran ed., 2017).
144. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2045
(1996).
145. See, e.g., MARK A. DRUMBL, ATROCITY, PUNISHMENT, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 174
(2007); MARK OSIEL, MASS ATROCITY, COLLECTIVE MEMORY, AND THE LAW 65-72 (1997); Barrie
Sander, The Expressive Turn of International Criminal Justice: A Field in Search of Meaning, 32 LEIDEN J. INT’L
CRIM. L. 851, 851-72 (2019).
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values.146 Other expressivists emphasize international criminal punishment’s
vindication for the victim’s human dignity that the perpetrator’s crime
denied.147 Either way, the expressivist concerns herself with strengthening
faith in the rule of law over deterrence or retributive justifications.148
As Paul Roberts reminds us, international criminal justice can only serve
as part of the justice picture.149 Professor Mark Drumbl asserts that, though
atrocities are “universal evils,” such crimes against humanity can be
sanctioned in diverse manners.150 What matters, he posits, is the universal
condemnability of the underlying substantive harm and the notion that
perpetrators of that harm must be held to account.151 Slavery and the slave
trade are harms with such requisite universal condemnation. Moreover,
Drumbl finds value in classifying atrocities, including slavery and the slave
trade, as “more than just crimes.”152 In addition to private law, such as tort or
contract, and quasilegal initiatives, such as truth commissions,153
international human rights law, despite its limitations discussed supra,
enhances accountability and furthers transformative justice for slavery and
slave trade prohibitions.
Indeed, human rights law can round out additional aspects of achieving
justice and accountability. In contrast to international criminal justice, the
international human rights framework expresses the moral condemnation
of states’ failures to uphold contractual legal obligations to other states to
respect, protect, and fulfill human rights of individuals within their borders
146. See generally DAVID GARLAND, PUNISHMENT AND MODERN SOCIETY: A STUDY IN SOCIAL
THEORY (1990) (arguing that punishment is a complex social institution affecting social relations and
cultural meanings); EMILE DURKHEIM, MORAL EDUCATION: A STUDY IN THE THEORY AND
APPLICATION OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF EDUCATION (1961) (explaining the sociology and socialization
of morality while interrogating the meanings of the term “society”); EMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION
OF LABOR IN SOCIETY (1933) (offering an evolutionary approach to the development of moral norms
in society); Salif Nimaga, An International Conscience Collective? A Durkheimian Analysis of International
Criminal Law, 7 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 561, 590-617 (2007). Even if victims are vindicated as a
consequence of international criminal trials, full expressive vindication is not possible at the ICC given
the structural omissions of slavery as a war crime and the slave trade as a war crime and crime against
humanity. See infra Part III.
147. Jean Hampton, The Retributive Idea, in FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 111, 122-43 (Jeffrie G.
Murphy & Jean Hampton eds., 1988); Jean Hampton, Correcting Harms Versus Righting Wrongs: The Goal
of Retribution, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1659 (1991-1992). But see, e.g., Alexander Zahar, Witness memory and the
manufacture of evidence at the international criminal tribunals, in FUTURE PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 600, 603 (Carsten Stahn & Larissa van den Herik eds., 2010) (demonstrating
limitations in fact-finding and defects in witness testimony that undermine effective criminal
punishment and thereby detract from vindicating human dignity of victims).
148. See, e.g., DRUMBL, supra note 145, at 173.
149. Id. at 181 (citing Paul Roberts, Restoration and Retribution in International Criminal Justice: An
Exploratory Analysis, in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 115, 119 (von Hirsch et al. eds.,
2002)).
150. Id. at 182.
151. Id. at 183 (emphasis in original).
152. Id.
153. Id.
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(or anywhere they are violated for erga omnes obligations such as slavery and
the slave trade).154 Additionally, while international human rights law
similarly expresses vindication or restoration of victims’ human dignity, the
legal framework centers victims of human rights violations—generally as
petitioners or parties in litigation and direct voices in advocacy—providing
a complementary and structurally comprehensive expressive function of
vindication of dignity and value denied by the violations. Further, state
responsibility under human rights law obligates states to provide reparations
for harms suffered, thereby expressing a reparative, restorative signal to
victims that society owes for failing to respect and to “ensure respect” for
slavery and the slave trade prohibitions under international human rights
law.155
Moreover, international human rights law focuses on domestic law
reform toward changing legal, economic, and other institutional structures
perpetuating systems of harms, such as slavery and the slave trade. As
trafficking scholars have argued with regard to centering the criminal law
response to combat exploitation harms, centering the international criminal
law response to combat ownership harms of slavery and slave trade similarly
may deter real, structural changes.156 More attention to comprehensive legal
responses, including a recommitment to international human rights law
implementation specifically for slavery and the slave trade, may provide the
necessary avenues for structural change.
Finally, as I have argued elsewhere,157 human trafficking enforcement
just does not do all of the legal work necessary to lend full expressive justice
for slavery and slave trade harms. These prohibitions are legally distinct and
must not be conflated or misapplied.158 Even in the human rights law
regime, human trafficking is enumerated only in the CEDAW, protecting
women and girls, and in the CRC, protecting children of all genders, but
neither purports to address human trafficking against adults of all other
genders, including men.159 Slavery and the slave trade, when also present,
can address some of the harm not picked up by trafficking as slavery and
slave trade definitions are broader and offer higher normative protections
for all persons regardless of age or gender.
154. Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 24, at art. 3.
155. Id. at art. 31.
156. Anne T. Gallagher, The International Legal Definition of “Trafficking in Persons”: Scope and
Application, in REVISITING THE LAW AND GOVERNANCE OF TRAFFICKING, FORCED LABOR AND
MODERN SLAVERY 83, 83-111 (Prabha Kotiswaran ed., 2017).
157. Kestenbaum, supra note 25.
158. Id.
159. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women art. 6, Dec.
18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13; Convention on the Rights of the Child arts. 34 & 35, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577
U.N.T.S. 3.
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III. GAPS IN INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC LAW APPLICATION TO
SLAVERY AND SLAVE TRADE HARMS
Through an examination of some limitations of current international
law enforcement—focusing on human trafficking in domestic/
transnational criminal law and, to a lesser extent, state accountability in
human rights law, and enslavement and sexual slavery in international
criminal law—this section demonstrates the continued need for
enforcement and state compliance with the human rights prohibitions of
slavery and the slave trade. A renewed focus on slavery and especially on the
slave trade in the international human rights law regime can, in a
complementary way, bring accountability, victim redress, potential for
structural reform and even transformational change at the domestic levels,
where international human rights law matters most.
Additionally, attention to enforcement of slave trade prohibitions brings
an opportunity to prevent slavery, the crime that nearly always follows slave
trading. An examination of the current international human rights advocacy
and jurisprudence at the regional levels demonstrates the current challenges
and opportunities in restoring states’ human rights commitments and
compliance with slavery and the slave trade prohibitions in international law.

A. Human Trafficking and Transnational Criminal Law
In questioning the need for a renewed focus on slavery and the slave
trade prohibitions in international law, the conversation tends to center on
the relative success of the “modern day slavery” abolitionist movement to
eradicate human trafficking.160 Today’s campaign to end “modern slavery”
centers on the international law on human trafficking,161 not on slavery and
slave trade prohibitions. Professor Chantal Thomas calls this strategic
positioning of “new abolitionists” the “slavery-trafficking nexus.”162 Ariela
Gross and Thomas speak to the dangers of conflating slavery and the slave
trade with human trafficking, from both historical and legal advocacy
160. Kestenbaum, supra note 25. As I have argued, the human trafficking regime should remain
distinct from slavery and the slave trade prohibitions because human trafficking as a transnational crime
and human rights violation does not adequately prevent, punish, and redress slavery and slave trade
harms. Moreover, distinguishing the slave trade and slavery from human trafficking affords additional
avenues for redress, maximizing full expressive accountability for states’ obligations to prohibit slavery
and the slave trade at the international and domestic levels.
161. Chantal Thomas, Immigration Controls and “Modern-Day Slavery,” in REVISITING THE LAW AND
GOVERNANCE OF TRAFFICKING, FORCED LABOR AND MODERN SLAVERY 212 (Prabha Kotiswaran
ed., 2017); see also Janie Chuang, The Challenges and Perils of Reframing Trafficking as “Modern-Day Slavery,”
5 ANTI-TRAFFICKING REV. 146, 146-49 (2015). Slavery is defined as an exploitative purpose of
trafficking under the Palermo Protocol, so in that way the definitions are connected.
162. Thomas, supra note 161.
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perspectives.163 They argue that drawing legal and conceptual connections
between slavery as it manifested prior to late 19th century abolition and
human trafficking is problematic, not only because the origins of these two
prohibitions is different, but also because it impedes progress toward
combating both of these legally distinct harms.164 Relatedly, Janie Chuang
uncovers what she calls “exploitation creep:” human trafficking’s
problematic doctrinal expansion in international and domestic U.S. law into
other legal terrain, including forced labor and slavery prohibitions.165 As I
have detailed in previous writings, the legal prohibition of human trafficking
developed on a parallel track, distinct from slavery and the slave trade
prohibitions in international law.166
Several reasons exist to ensure that human rights harms are
characterized correctly as slavery, the slave trade, trafficking, and/or other
related prohibitions in international law. First, as outlined above, the slave
trade and slavery continue today despite clear prohibitions under
international law and should be pursued as such in addition to—or, at times,
instead of—human trafficking. There are times when the exercise of
ownership powers may not include exploitation (slavery but not human
trafficking) or there may be times when there is an intent to bring a person
into or maintain them in a situation of slavery without exercising ownership
powers or exploitation (slave trade, but not slavery or human trafficking).
Second, the elevated status of prohibitions of slavery and the slave trade
as non-derogable rights, erga omnes obligations, and jus cogens norms under
customary and treaty law ensure the broadest legal protections for victimssurvivors. Erasing or disabling the peremptory status of slavery and the slave
trade is to renounce binding obligations and possibly alter customary
international law through either or both state practice and opinio juris.167

163. Ariela J. Gross & Chantal Thomas, The New Abolitionism, International Law, and the Memory of
Slavery, 35 L. & HIST. REV. 99, 100 (2017); see also Kestenbaum, supra note 25 (discussing this issue from
the slavery and slave trade angle and the need to keep slavery, the slave trade, and human trafficking
distinct and disaggregated as crimes).
164. Gross & Thomas, supra note 163, at 104.
165. Janie A. Chuang, Exploitation Creep and the Unmaking of Human Trafficking Law, 108 AM. J.
INT’L L. 609, 609-49 (2014).
166. Jocelyn Getgen Kestenbaum, Disaggregating Slavery and the Slave Trade, 16 FIU L. REV. 515,
528-42 (2022).
167. Customary international law (CIL) is a source of international law and refers to the
international obligations of states arising from general and consistent practice of states (state practice)
followed from a general sense of legal obligation (opinio juris). Statute of the International Court of
Justice (ICJ), art. 38, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 33 U.N.T.S. 993. See, e.g., MALCOLM N. SHAW Q.C.,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 68-80 (5th ed., 2003) (providing a treatise on international law, including
custom as a source of international law); William S. Dodge, Customary International Law and the Question
of Legitimacy, 120 HARV. L. REV. 19 (2007) (finding that an article arguing for Congressional action for
courts to apply customary international law misinterprets international law).
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Altering customary international law consequently may limit these broad
protections that exist under current international law.
Third, human rights law offers additional, complementary state
responsibility accountability mechanisms to individual criminal liability for
more comprehensive harm redress. Fourth, characterizing the precursory
acts to slavery not as human trafficking but as the slave trade—or, if the
factual circumstances permit, as both the slave trade and human
trafficking—allows a surfacing of these harms and perpetrators for judicial
redress at the domestic and international levels.168 Correct delineation of
these prohibitions untangles the conflations and confusions of juridical
safeguards to ensure full redress to survivors of human trafficking, slavery,
and the slave trade.169 In many domestic contexts, perpetrators are getting
away with committing acts of slavery and the slave trade, and victims are not
receiving full redress for these harms, even when human trafficking or other
crimes, such as material support for terrorism, is prosecuted and
punished.170 Labels matter for expressive value and victims’ perceptions in
receiving adequate justice.
International law on human trafficking mainly centers on the
transnational organized crime frame over the human rights frame. Legal
realist critiques, such as those offered by Paulette Lloyd and Beth Simmons,
find that many developed countries’ state interests aligned in globalization’s

168. In fact, the increased attention to these harms as international crimes has led to a few cases
in domestic and international human rights law courts. See, e.g., Potentially Groundbreaking Case
Against Lebanon’s Kafala System, FREEDOM UNITED, Feb. 13, 2022, https://www.freedom
united.org/news/slavery-case-lebanon-kafala/; C.N. & V. v. France, App. No. 67724/09 (Oct. 11,
2012); C.N. v. the United Kingdom, App. No. 4239/08 (Nov. 13, 2012) (discussing obligations to
investigate in slavery cases, but conflating trafficking with slavery harms and ultimately striking the case
out); Hadijatou Mani Koroua v. The Republic of Niger, Judgment, ECW/CCJ/JUD/06/08 (Oct. 27,
2008); Maya Indigenous People v. Guatemala, Petition 844/05, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No.
13/08, OEA/Ser.L/V/JJ.134, doc. 5 rev. 1 (2008) (finding erga omnes obligations to open an
investigation into acts of slavery of children); Fazenda Brasil Verde v. Brazil, Petition 12.066, InterAm. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 169/11, OEA/SER/l/V/J.143, doc. 53 (2011). But see Siliadin v.
France, App. No. 73316/01, §122 (July 26, 2005) (finding servitude and forced labor but, rather
controversially, that harms, including confiscation of passport, forced labor without pay or time off for
many years, and control over autonomy, did not amount to slavery). For a review of regional human
rights jurisprudence on slavery and related harms, see Helen Duffy, Litigating Modern Day Slavery in
Regional Courts, 14 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 375, 375-403 (2016). Duffy’s analysis, which includes a regional
human rights case on human trafficking (Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia) demonstrates the conflation
and confusion between slavery and human trafficking at the regional human rights level. Id. In Rantsev
v. Cyprus and Russia, for example, the European Court of Human Rights reads the prohibition of
human trafficking into the European Convention’s article 4 prohibition on slavery and servitude. See
Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia, App. No. 25965/04, § 276 (Jan. 7, 2010).
169. Sellers & Kestenbaum, supra note 3.
170. See, e.g., HUM. RTS. WATCH, FLAWED JUSTICE: ACCOUNTABILITY FOR ISIS CRIMES IN IRAQ
27 (2017).
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wake,171 arguing that a “broad coalition of states had much to gain by
choosing a prosecutorial model over one that makes human rights or victim
protection its top priority.”172 Like other transnational criminal law regimes,
concerns of Western hegemony at both points of commitment and
compliance remain in human trafficking enforcement.173 Many scholars
have critiqued the ideological foundations of human trafficking, finding that
the transnational criminal law approach permits the perpetuation of the
myth that a few “bad apples” (traffickers) commit these acts while
supporting the continuation of harmful structures, such as global capitalism,
to the detriment of migrants and other vulnerable populations.174
Many of these criticisms are valid and resonate from the perspective of
anti-slavery and anti-slave trade law. Indeed, the recognition that slavery and
the slave trade manifest today as such is a recognition that abolition as
eradication of the practice was not successful, that the narrative of “slavery
to freedom” has not been historically accurate, and that the debt of slavery
has not been paid.175 To focus on human trafficking as “modern slavery” is
to decouple past slavery crimes from racial injustice and necessary but
politically fraught conversations about reparations for past de jure systems of
slavery and the slave trade.176 Instead of rhetorical connections to slavery
and the slave trade, as Gross and Thomas suggest, today’s trafficking
advocacy should connect to the actual origins of human trafficking and
should not envelop slavery and the slave trade.177 Further, they opine that
addressing human trafficking harms through the lenses of international
171. Prabha Kotiswaran, From Sex Panic to Extreme Exploitation: Revisiting the Law and Governance of
Human Trafficking, in REVISITING THE LAW AND GOVERNANCE OF TRAFFICKING, FORCED LABOR
AND MODERN SLAVERY 126 (Prabha Kotiswaran ed., 2017).
172. Paulette Lloyd & Beth A. Simmons, Framing the New Transnational Legal Order: The Case of
Human Trafficking, in TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS 400-38 (T.C. Halliday & G. Shaffer eds., 2015).
173. See Neil Boister, Transnational Criminal Law?, 14 EUR. J. INT’L L. 953, 957-58 (2003).
174. See, e.g., Julia O’Connell Davidson, The Right to Locomotion? Trafficking, Slavery and the State, in
REVISITING THE LAW AND GOVERNANCE ON TRAFFICKING, FORCED LABOR AND MODERN
SLAVERY 157-78 (Prabha Kotiswaran ed., 2017); Chantal Thomas, Immigration Controls and “Modern-Day
Slavery,” in REVISITING THE LAW AND GOVERNANCE ON TRAFFICKING, FORCED LABOR AND
MODERN SLAVERY 212-37 (Prabha Kotiswaran ed., 2017); Janet Halley, Anti-Trafficking and the New
Indenture, in REVISITING THE LAW AND GOVERNANCE ON TRAFFICKING, FORCED LABOR AND
MODERN SLAVERY 179-211 (Prabha Kotiswaran ed., 2017); and Kerry Rittich, Representing, Counting,
Valuing: Managing Definitional Uncertainty in the Law of Trafficking, in REVISITING THE LAW AND
GOVERNANCE ON TRAFFICKING, FORCED LABOR AND MODERN SLAVERY 238-72 (Prabha
Kotiswaran ed., 2017); Joel Quirk & Julia O’Connell Davidson, Introduction, in E-BOOK ON POPULAR
AND POLITICAL REPRESENTATIONS 16, 20-25 (Joel Quirk & Julia O’Connell Davidson eds., 2016).
175. Cf. Gross & Thomas, supra note 163 at 106-08. Today’s renewed discussions to provide
reparations for the Transatlantic Slave Trade and domestic slave trades in countries like the United
States are evidence of this need to combat false narratives and center victims and descendants of slavery
harms.
176. See id.
177. Id. at 102-03. (See also Jocelyn Getgen Kestenbaum, Disaggregating Slavery and the Slave Trade,
16 FIU L. REV. 515, 542-55 (2022)).
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labor law and migration law as opposed to transnational criminal law may
better address the structures that support such coercive practices for the
purpose of exploitation of (sex and) labor.178
Scholars and practitioners alike also have criticized the human
trafficking transnational criminal law focus for targeting sex workers and for
not addressing labor exploitation.179 Other critics have pointed out the
overreliance on criminal law to further the agendas of border control, state
sovereignty, and national security has prioritized powerful interests and
undermined the rights of migrants, asylum seekers, sex workers, and
trafficking victims.180 In addition, the nearly exclusive focus on enslavement
and sexual slavery in international criminal law and human trafficking in
domestic criminal law has stymied conversations about the continued
perpetration, state complicity, and economic structures that perpetuate
systems of slavery and the slave trade as these harms manifest today.

B. Enslavement, Sexual Slavery, and the Slave Trade in Domestic and International
Law Forums
1. Domestic Criminal Law Forums
The strength and breadth of slavery and the slave trade “super
norms”181 prohibitions in international law provide additional and varied
legal avenues for accountability and redress in domestic and international
forums alike. Take the case of the slavery and slave trade crimes perpetrated
against the Yazidis, for example. Multiple failed attempts of the United
Nations Security Council to refer the situations in Iraq and Syria to the
ICC182 elude justice and accountability for individual perpetrators of
178. Id.
179. Prabha Kotiswaran, From Sex Panic to Extreme Exploitation: Revisiting the Law and Governance of
Human Trafficking, in REVISITING THE LAW AND GOVERNANCE OF TRAFFICKING, FORCED LABOR
AND MODERN SLAVERY 17 (2017); see also K. Skrivankova, Between Decent Work and Forced Labour:
Examining the Continuum of Exploitation (Joseph Rowntree Found., programme paper, 2010),
https://www.jrf.org.uk/report/between-decent-work-and-forced-labour-examining-continuumexploitation.
180. Anne T. Gallagher, Human Rights and the New U.N. Protocols on Trafficking and Migrant Smuggling:
A Preliminary Analysis, 23 HUM. RTS. Q. 975, 994 (2001); Mike Dottridge, Introduction, in COLLATERAL
DAMAGE: THE IMPACT OF ANTI-TRAFFICKING MEASURES ON HUMAN RIGHTS AROUND THE
WORLD 1-27 (Global Alliance Against Traffic in Women ed., 2007).
181. Jean Allain, Slavery, in SLAVERY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: OF HUMAN EXPLOITATION AND
TRAFFICKING 110 (2012). This term was originally coined by James Crawford. James Crawford,
Multilateral Rights and Obligations in International Law, in 319 COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE
ACADEMY 452 (2006).
182. The veto power of the permanent five (P5) members of the UN Security Council has
impeded an international criminal investigation by the Office of the Prosecutor of the International
Criminal Court. But see generally JENNIFER TRAHAN, EXISTING LEGAL LIMITS TO SECURITY COUNCIL
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genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes in these atrocity contexts.
Given that all of these international crimes include slavery and slave trade
perpetration, as well as state responsibility for human rights violations of
slavery and the slave trade, accountability also could be addressed in other
forums for other forms of redress.
In Germany, prosecutors have taken the lead in advancing cases of inter
alia genocide and enslavement against Yazidi victims under universal
jurisdiction statutes183 that permit such criminal cases given the gravity of
the offenses when the perpetrators are found in the territory of the state
even when the crime occurred in another state. First, universal jurisdiction
cases reflect third party state compliance with their state responsibility to
address violations of jus cogens norms.
While these cases have advanced criminal accountability and third party
state responsibility in monumental ways, human rights litigation and
advocacy recognizing state accountability for violations of slavery and slave
trade prohibitions by offending states additionally could improve access to
justice for the range of harms experienced by Yazidis and other victims.184
Further, pressing for state responsibility under international law has the
potential to address more directly the domestic structures of the violating
state that perpetuate slavery and the slave trade institutions, systems, and
practices.
To illustrate, the recent Taha Al J. case in the Higher Regional Court
(OLG) of Frankfurt convicted the defendant, a former ISIL member, of
genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes for enslaving a Yazidi
woman, Nora B., and her five-year-old daughter, Reda, after purchasing
VETO POWER IN THE FACE OF ATROCITY CRIMES (Cambridge Univ. Press eds., 2020) (making the
case that there are certain circumstances in which states are violating international law by exercising
the veto power to block international action against atrocity crimes).
183. Customary international law is less settled, but treaty law does explicitly and implicitly permit
jurisdiction under the universality principle. E.g., Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277; see JAMES CRAWFORD,
BROWNLIE’S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (Cambridge Univ. Press eds., 8th ed.
2012). But see, e.g., Henry Kissinger, The Pitfalls of Universal Jurisdiction, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, July-Aug.
2001, at 86 (giving a broad general critique of universal jurisdiction); Jack Goldsmith & Stephen D.
Krasner, The Limits of Idealism, DAEDALUS, Winter 2003, at 47 (discussing the general concept of
universal jurisdiction and warning that it has the potential to engender international conflict). Universal
jurisdiction enables states to prosecute and try—under certain conditions—suspects of international
crimes regardless of where the crimes were committed and the nationality of the perpetrators and
victims. See Völkerstrafgesetzbuch [CCAIL] [Code of Crimes against International Law],
https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_vstgb/englisch_vstgb.html (Ger.).
184. Alexandra Lily Kather & Johanna Groß, Truly Historic, The World’s First Conviction for Genocide
Against the Yazidi, VÖELKERRECHTSBLOG (Dec. 17, 2021), available at https://
voelkerrechtsblog.org/truly-historic/. This case was also the first universal jurisdiction trial to charge
the crime of genocide under the Code of Crimes against International Law (CCAIL,
“Völkerstrafgesetzbuch”) in Germany. Völkerstrafgesetzbuch [CCAIL] [Code of Crimes against
International Law], https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_vstgb/englisch_vstgb.html (Ger.).
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them at a slave market in Raqqa in 2015.185 The OLG convicted Taha Al J.,
sentencing him to life in prison and ordering him to compensate Nora B.
EUR 50.000 in reparations for the pain and suffering she endured and
continues to endure as a result of her and her daughter’s enslavement, as
well as the shackling and torture of her daughter, which led to the child’s
foreseeable death.186
This criminal court decision, while critically important, is only one part
of the larger justice and accountability picture. Here, the slave trading and
slavery system factually was proven in court. They formed the foundation
enabling many if not all international crimes perpetrated against the Yazidis
who were captured and not immediately executed on Mount Sinjar.187 The
states of Iraq and Syria have permitted the system to continue today.188
Thus, the demand for state accountability for human rights violations is an
important complement to redress these harms and reform domestic laws
and institutions to prevent future enslavement systems’ perpetuation within
state borders.
Indeed, once slavery and slave trade crimes are proven in a domestic
universal jurisdiction case, obligations for state reparations to victims are
required next steps under human rights law.189 Under customary
international law and treaty law—the ICCPR in this case—Iraq is obligated
to prohibit slavery and the slave trade; thus, victims of slavery crimes must
receive redress from the state’s failure to protect individuals within its
borders.190 And Germany has erga omnes obligations to enforce these jus cogens
human rights obligations as well.191 All of these efforts could improve
accountability and address the very structures that cause perpetuation of
slavery and slave trade institutions, systems, and practices in offending
states.
185. Ordentliche Gerichtsbarkeit Hessen, Higher Regional Court Frankfurt/Main sentences Taha Al-J.
to lifelong imprisonment for genocide and other criminal offences (Nov. 30, 2021), https://ordentlichegerichtsbarkeit.hessen.de/pressemitteilungen/higher-regional-court-frankfurtmain-sentences-taha-alj-to-lifelong-imprisonment (last visited Feb. 5, 2022). Notably, criminal conduct that constituted the
actus reus of the slave trade was not charged or prosecuted as such due to structural limitations in the
domestic statute.
186. Id.
187. See They Came to Destroy, supra note 8, at § 55.
188. See Pari Ibrahim & Murad Ismael, Seven Years After the Genocide, Yazidis are Still Waiting for
Justice, WASH. POST (Aug. 3, 2021), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/08/03/
yezidis-are-still-waiting-justice-seven-years-later/ (finding that thousands of Yazidis are unaccounted
for, and many are likely still in captivity); Margaret Evans, Beekeeper Turned Spymaster Searches for Iraq’s
Missing Yazidis, CBC NEWS (Apr. 16, 2021), https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/yazidi-iraq-syria-isis1.5989166.
189. See Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 24.
190. ICCPR, art. (8)(1) (ratification by Iraq); G.A. Res. 60/147, Basic Principles and Guidelines
on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human
Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law (Dec. 16, 2005).
191. See Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 24.

88

VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 63:1

Further, slavery and the slave trade’s “super-normative” status in
international law is important for broader avenues for justice and
accountability that would not exist in characterizing harms as transnational
crimes only. For example, one case against cement company LaFarge in
France and its subsidiary LaFarge Cement Syria has survived motions to
dismiss on the evidence that the company, through direct payments to ISIL
totaling at least EUR 13 million in order to continue operations in Syria, is
complicit in crimes against humanity and genocide.192 Between 2012 and
2014, LaFarge is alleged to be complicit in crimes against humanity,
including slavery and slave trade crimes, perpetrated as part of a widespread
or systematic attack against the civilian population, including the Yazidis, in
Syria.193 The jus cogens, international criminal nature of the harms of slavery
and the slave trade have sustained these actions before France’s Court of
Cassation. Legally characterizing these harms as human trafficking or other
domestic or transnational crimes would not permit this case for corporate
accountability to proceed as per the international nature of the crimes and
normative status of slavery and slave trade prohibitions. In this case, France
must hold this corporate actor to account as part of its obligation not to
breach jus cogens norms and incur state responsibility for international
wrongful acts.194
2. International Criminal Law Forums
In addition to the general limitations of the international criminal law
regime discussed in Part II.B supra—i.e., that individual criminal
accountability targets only a few, albeit possibly the worst, “bad apple”
perpetrators and that it is not centered on victims, state-sponsored redress
in the form of reparations, structural transformation, or restorative justice—
the Rome Statute of the ICC poses additional structural limitations that
make international human rights law a significant and necessary
192. European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights (ECCHR), Historic victory before French
Supreme Court on the indictment of multinational Lafarge for complicity in crimes against humanity in Syria (Sept. 7,
2021), available at https://www.ecchr.eu/en/press-release/historic-victory-before-french-supremecourt-on-the-indictment-of-multinational-lafarge-for-complicity-in-crimes-against-humanity-in-syria/.
Cases are also being brought against LaFarge corporate executives for financing a terrorist organization,
deliberate endangerment, and undignified labor conditions. Sherpa & European Center for
Constitutional and Human Rights, Press Release: Submission from Sherpa and ECCHR on an Indictment of
LaFarge for Complicity in Crimes Against Humanity (May 15, 2018), https://www.ecchr.eu/fileadmin/
Pressemitteilungen_englisch/PR_CP-CCH_Lafarge-EN_150518.pdf.
193. ECCHR, Case Report: Lafarge in Syria: accusations of complicity in war crimes and crimes against
humanity (last updated Nov. 2016), https://www.ecchr.eu/fileadmin/Fallbeschreibungen/Case_
Report_Lafarge_Syria_ECCHR.pdf.
194. Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (Ruggie Principles), available at https://
www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/publications/guidingprinciplesbusinesshr_en.pdf;
Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 24.
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complement to retributive, carceral frames of justice for slavery and slave
trade harms.195
While customary international law,196 including humanitarian law,197
criminalizes slavery and the slave trade as per the 1926 Slavery Convention
definitions,198 the Rome Statute of the ICC diverges significantly from
custom in this regard. The Rome Statute criminalizes enslavement—defined
as slavery and including some of the actus reus of the slave trade—as a crime
against humanity but not as a war crime.199 Additionally, the Rome Statute
includes sexual slavery as a crime against humanity and war crime, which is
encompassed by slavery and enslavement in customary international law.200
The slave trade is not enumerated under the Rome Statute. Consequently,
international criminal law under the Rome Statute is limited structurally to
address the breadth of slavery and slave trade harms. Human rights law
prohibitions can fill such structural lacunae in opening additional avenues
for expressive justice.

195. Sellers & Kestenbaum, supra note 8, at 532-36.
196. Customary international law is a binding source of public international law consisting of
“general practice accepted as law.” Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, June 26, 1945,
59 Stat. 1055, 33 U.N.T.S. 993. For a rule to be considered law under customary international law, two
elements must be present: state practice and the belief that such practice is required as a matter of law
(opinio juris). The North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Ger. v. Den.; Ger. v. Neth.), Judgment, 1969 I.C.J.
3, ⁋ 77 (Feb. 20).
197. See Lieber Code, 1863, arts. 42, 58; IMT Charter, 1945, art. 6 (“deportation to slave labor”);
Allied Control Council Law No. 10, 1945, art. II(1) (“deportation to slave labor”); 1977 Additional
Protocol II, art. 4(2)(f) (“slavery and the slave trade in all their forms” are and shall remain prohibited);
International Committee of the Red Cross, ‘Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law,’
Practice Related to Rule 94: Slavery and Slave Trade; see Sellers & Kestenbaum, supra note 8, at 517-42.
198. For an in-depth discussion of slavery and the slave trade under customary international law,
see Patricia Viseur Sellers & Jocelyn Getgen Kestenbaum, Sexual Slavery and Customary International Law,
in PROSECUTING THE PRESIDENT (Sharon Weill et al. eds., 2020); Sellers & Kestenbaum, supra note 8,
at 517-42.
199. The term “war crimes” refers to serious breaches of international humanitarian law
committed against civilians or others outside of combat during an international or non-international
armed conflict. In contrast, “crimes against humanity” encompasses crimes, such as murder,
extermination, rape, persecution, and all other inhumane acts of a similar character (willfully causing
great suffering, or serious injury to body, or to mental or physical health), committed “as part of a
widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack”
in times of peace or conflict. See Rome Statute, arts. 7 & 8.
200. Patricia Visseur Sellers, Wartime Female Slavery: Enslavement?, 44 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 115, 11543 (2011); Sellers & Kestenbaum, Slavery and the Slave Trade, supra note 3. The most recent ICC judgment,
Prosecutor v. Dominic Ongwen, illustrates the Rome Statute’s structural limitations for accountability
for slavery/enslavement and the slave trade in international law. See ICC-02/04-01/15, Judgment (Feb.
4, 2021); Patricia Viseur Sellers and Jocelyn Getgen Kestenbaum, Ongwen, OPINIO JURIS, June 11, 2021;
Prosecutor v. Ongwen, ICC-02/04-01/15, Amicus Curiae brief by Ashraph et al. (Dec. 23, 2021),
chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/viewer.html?pdfurl=https%
3A%2F%2Fwww.icc-cpi.int%2FCourtRecords%2FCR2021_11909.PDF&clen=579371&chunk=
true. Further, though not a structural deficiency, the Rome Statute includes language on human
trafficking but confers jurisdiction only over international crimes, not transnational crimes. Human
trafficking is a transnational crime.
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3. Regional Human Rights Law Forums
Finally, the regional human rights law systems of state responsibility for
domestic failures continue to provide an important backstop for victim
redress and possibilities for structural reform when states fail to ensure
respect for human rights. Two recent slavery cases adjudicated before the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights against Brazil201 and Venezuela202
provide examples of the potential—and the challenges—in achieving full
accountability for states’ failures to ensure respect for prohibitions of slavery
and the slave trade.
In the 2016 case of Fazenda Brasil Verde v. Brazil, for example, the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) found Brazil responsible for
the human rights violations of inter alia slavery and the slave trade.203 The
IACtHR ordered the state to provide reparations in the form of
investigation, prosecution, punishment, compensation to victims, and
domestic law reform to ensure that statute of limitations do not apply to
slavery crimes in future cases in Brazil.204 In 2018, in the case of López Soto
v. Venezuela, the IACtHR found Venezuela responsible for violations of inter
alia (sexual) slavery prohibitions under the American Convention.205
Even in the few regional human rights slavery cases adjudicated, there
is a need to recommit to state responsibility for violations of slave trade
prohibitions. In each of these cases, slave trade conduct was described, but
never legally characterized as such, even when Brazil and Venezuela
criminalized the slave trade as “reduction into slavery” in domestic law.206
Instead, the Inter-American Commission regarded the phrase “slave trade
and traffic in women” as “human trafficking” as defined under the Palermo
Protocol.207 The Court also overlooked abductions and kidnapping (actus
reus of the slave trade) as part of the slavery crimes perpetrated.208
Recommitting to enforcement of slave trade prohibitions will better ensure
201. Fazenda Brasil Verde v. Brazil, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, InterAm. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 318 (Oct. 20, 2016).
202. Lopez Soto v. Venezuela, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser.
C) No. 362 (Sept. 26, 2018).
203. Fazenda Brasil Verde v. Brazil, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 318 (Oct. 20, 2016). This
was the first case to find a violation of Art. 6(1) of the American Convention on Human Rights.
204. Id.
205. Lopez Soto v. Venezuela, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 362, ¶ 149 (Sept. 26, 2018).
206. Facts in each case include “abductions” and “transports.” The Court even takes note of
article 149 of the Brazilian Penal Code, which prohibits “reducing a person to conditions analogous to
slavery,” but does not discuss the slave trade explicitly. Artículo 149 del C.P. Brasileño. Lopez Soto v.
Venezuela, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 362, ¶ 107 (Sept. 26, 2018) (citing the Criminal Code of the
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Official Gazette No. 915 of June 30, 1964, art. 174).
207. Fazenda Brasil Verde v. Brazil, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 318, ¶¶ 289-90 (Oct. 20,
2016).
208. See Lopez Soto v. Venezuela, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 362, ¶ 145 (Sept. 26, 2018)
(kidnapping or disappearance).
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that all violations are redressed, at least with regard to state responsibility,
under regional human rights law and domestic criminal law.

IV. RECOMMITTING TO SLAVERY AND THE SLAVE TRADE
PROHIBITIONS: OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES
International human rights law institutions and advocacy can
accomplish several important goals, including: (1) expanding accountability
to addressing state responsibility in addition to individual criminal liability;
(2) expanding avenues for victim redress, including by addressing structural
violence; and (3) improving the expressive functions of international law.
While international human rights law matters, misconceptions about slavery
and the slave trade have led to uneven implementation—if any—in the
modern international human rights law regime. This Part reviews
opportunities for recommitting to slavery and the slave trade under
international human rights law, arguing for a cautious implementation and
enforcement of the human rights prohibitions of slavery and the slave trade
while exploring challenges toward these goals.

A. ICCPR and Human Rights Committee
Despite the clear enumerations of slavery and slave trade prohibitions
in the ICCPR, and despite their “super-norm” status in international law,
the Human Rights Committee (HRC), the ICCPR’s treaty monitoring body,
has yet to issue a General Comment209 to interpret state obligations on
Article 8’s prohibitions of slavery and the slave trade.210 Moreover, the HRC,
through the language of General Comment 28, seemingly ignores the slave
trade as a distinct prohibition in international law.211 Possible slave trade acts
instead are characterized as perpetrators “recruiting,” “taking,” and
“receiving” victims, and human trafficking (and, notably, only of women
and children) is inserted without explanation given that it is a different, albeit

209. See, e.g., Helen Keller & Leena Grover, General Comments of Human Rights Committee and their
Legitimacy, in U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY BODIES: LAW AND LEGITIMACY 116, 124 (Helen Keller
& Geir Ulfstein eds., 2015).
210. In General Comment No. 28, interpreting Article 3 (Equality Rights between Men and
Women, 2000), however, the Committee has made explicit reference to Article 8 obligations, but has
conflated human trafficking and forced prostitution with slavery and slave trade harms. Human Rights
Comm., General Comment No. 28 on Article 3: The Equality of Rights Between Men and Women, ¶
12, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.10 (Mar. 29, 2000). (For an in-depth analysis of this
conflation, see Jocelyn Getgen Kestenbaum, Disaggregating Slavery and the Slave Trade, 16 FIU L. Rev. 515
(2022).
211. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 28 on Article 3: The Equality of Rights
Between Men and Women, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.10 (Mar. 29, 2000).

92

VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 63:1

related, prohibition that is not even among the enumerated rights provisions
of the ICCPR.212
The Human Rights Committee also has issued quasi-judicial individual
communications that overlook state responsibility for slavery and the slave
trade violations, even when the facts suggest that slavery and slave trade
harms have occurred.213 Further, HRC’s concluding observations have
conflated and confused slavery, the slave trade, and human trafficking while
overlooking the slave trade as a separate human rights violation.214
While some of these factual circumstances also may constitute human
trafficking, the slave trade prohibition is the human rights violation within
the HRC’s purview given the ICCPR’s explicit enumeration of the slave
trade in article 8. Where slavery violations exist, slave trade violations nearly
always accompany such harms.215 State parties have a legal obligation to
address the precursory acts to slavery through the prohibition of the slave
trade; thus, the petitioners and the HRC should characterize the harms
correctly as acts of the slave trade.
212. Author Vladislava Stoyanova argues that this insertion implies that the Human Rights
Committee has brought human trafficking of women and children into the scope of Article 8 of the
ICCPR. She finds that such an insertion requires explanation given the ICCPR drafter’s explicit
rejection of human trafficking within the purview of Article 8. See Vladislava Stoyanova, United Nations
Against Slavery: Unravelling Concepts, Institutions and Obligations, 38(3) MICH. J. INT’L L. 359, 406 (2017).
This reasoning, however, would further confuse and conflate these related but distinct prohibitions in
international law. To correct course, the Human Rights Committee should draft a general comment
on Article 8 and clearly delineate the legal definitions of slavery and the slave trade without referencing
human trafficking, while recognizing explicitly that human trafficking is not included within the scope
of Article 8.
213. Human Rights Comm., Views Adopted by the Committee under Article 5 (4) of the Optional
Protocol, Concerning Communication No. 2556/2015, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/125/D/2556/2015, ¶¶
2.2, 2.5, (May 22, 2019). One recent example from 2019 is the case of Fulmati Nyaya against Nepal in
which 300 Royal Nepalese Army and Armed Police Force officers entered a village during the civil war
in 2002 and arrested the communication’s author, a 14-year-old girl at the time, allegedly suspecting
her of being a Maoist. The soldiers dragged her into a truck; blindfolded and handcuffed her; detained
and interrogated her incommunicado; repeatedly beat, sexually assaulted, and raped her; and forced her
to “work in the barracks, such as carrying bricks and sand, making cement for the construction of a
temple, and watering the garden.” The HRC characterized the harms to include inter alia violations of
forced labor under Article 8(3) of the ICCPR. Id. These facts are similar to the Sepur Zarco case from
Guatemala in which sexual slavery was charged. Tribunal de Mayor Riesgo, 2016 “Guatemala c.
Esteelmer Francisco Reyes Girón y Heriberto Valdez Asig,” Sentencia C-01076-2012-00021.
214. For example, in its 2020 Concluding Observations on the Central African Republic, in
addressing trafficking in persons, forced labor and child soldiering, the HRC was “alarmed that children
are being recruited by armed groups for exploitation as combatants, sex slaves or workers in the mining
sector.” Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations on the Third Periodic Rep. of the Central
African Republic, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/CAF/CO/3, ¶¶ 29-30 (Apr. 30, 2020); Human Rights Comm.,
Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant: Concluding
Observations of the Human Rights Comm.: Mali, U.N. Doc. CCPR/CO/77/MLI, ¶ 17 (Apr. 16,
2003); Human Rights Comm., Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40
of the Covenant: Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Comm.: Sudan U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/SDN/CO/3, ¶ 18 (Aug. 29, 2007).
215. Generally, unless individuals are born into slavery, they have in one way or another been
brought into, or maintained in, a situation of slavery.
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Furthermore, the HRC in its 2019 Concluding Observations on the
Czech Republic216 and 2011 Concluding Observations on Kuwait217
evaluated compliance with article 8, but only examined trafficking in
persons. Thus, recent concluding observations demonstrate that the HRC
not only has overlooked the slave trade prohibition, but also has taken on
the issue of human trafficking,218 a human rights violation not explicitly
enumerated under the Covenant. Overlooking slavery and the slave trade
violations denies the full expressive functions of international human rights
law for the victims-survivors of these harms. Further, addressing factual
circumstances accurately under slavery and slave trade violations would
assist in recommitting to the implementation of these human rights norms
for substantive and possibly structural, transformative change at the
domestic levels.
The HRC is undermining institutional legitimacy in the short term by
incorrectly applying its legal mandate in assessing state compliance with
international treaty obligations under the ICCPR. In the long term, the
HRC’s non-application of slavery and slave trade provisions in cases in
which these violations are present results in inadequate justice and
accountability for victims of these harms while possibly leading to disabling
the customary international legal status of these harms.219

B. Regional and International Courts
Relevant international human rights treaty enforcement through the
courts also has ignored the slave trade and has focused very little attention
on slavery prohibitions. Where subsequent international human rights
enforcement has occurred for treaties that prohibit slavery, enforcement
bodies have drawn upon the 1926 Slavery Convention’s slavery definition,
replicated in the 1956 Supplementary Slavery Convention, and its
subsequent interpretations under international and domestic criminal law.220

216. Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations on the Fourth Periodic Rep. of Czechia,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/CZE/CO/4, ¶ 30 (Dec. 6, 2019).
217. Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations on the Second Periodic Rep. of Kuwait,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/KWT/CO/2 , ¶ 17 (Nov. 18, 2011).
218. See, e.g., Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations on the Fifth Periodic Rep. of
Portugal, U.N. Doc., CCPR/C/PRT/CO/5 (Apr. 28, 2020); Human Rights Comm., Concluding
Observations on the Sixth Periodic Rep. of Tunisia, U.N. Doc., CCPR/C/TUN/CO/6 (Apr. 24,
2020); Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations in the Absence of the Initial Rep. of Dominca,
U.N. Doc., CCPR/C/DMA/COAR/1 (Apr. 24, 2020).
219. See Jocelyn Getgen Kestenbaum, Disaggregating Slavery and the Slave Trade, 16 FIU L. REV. 515,
515, 581 (2022). Customary law status depends upon state practice and opinio juris. See supra note 20.
220. See, e.g., Fazenda Brasil Verde v. Brazil, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and
Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 318, ¶ 249 (Oct. 20, 2016).
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Generally, cases addressing human rights prohibitions of slavery have
been adjudicated at the regional and subregional human rights courts. The
IACtHR and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)
Court have interpreted their slavery provisions, but have not addressed the
slave trade as a separate human rights violation, except to say that it should
be read as human trafficking as defined under the Palermo Protocol.221
While the ECOWAS Court in Hadijatou Mani v. Niger set important
precedent to uphold the prohibition against slavery in Niger, the ruling
similarly overlooked that the Applicant was sold, slave traded from one
situation of slavery to another, at age 12 to a local chief in addition to her
being subjected to slavery and related human rights violations.222
Similar to the Rome Statute, the European Convention on Human
Rights includes slavery but does not include the slave trade definition among
its enumerated prohibitions.223 Furthermore, although the European Court
of Human Rights (ECtHR) applied the 1926 Convention slavery definition
in its first slavery case, Siliadin v. France, the Court incorrectly limited the
definition’s scope to de jure slavery.224
The ECtHR dismissed the allegation of slavery as not relevant to the
facts of the case, finding that Article 4 is limited to de jure slavery situations
only.225 Receiving heavy criticism, the Court narrowly interprets the
221. Fazenda Brasil Verde v. Brazil, Inter-Am. Court H.R. (ser. C) No. 318 (Oct. 20, 2016); Lopez
Soto v. Venezuela, Inter-Am. Court H.R. (ser. C) No. 362 (Sept. 26, 2018).
222. Hadijatou Mani Koroua v. The Republic of Niger, Judgment, ECW/CCJ/JUD/06/08 (Oct.
27, 2008).
223. Notably, the slave trade is not enumerated as a distinct prohibition under the European
Convention. Commentators and scholars have posited that the ECHR Article 4 drafting was modeled
after Article 4 of the UDHR and Article 8 of the ICCPR. For an in-depth analysis of the development
of these articles, see Jocelyn Getgen Kestenbaum, Disaggregating Slavery and the Slave Trade, 16 FIU L.
REV. 515, 554-71 (2022). That analysis is overlooking and ignoring the slave trade. While the language
of slavery, servitude, and forced labor seems nearly identical, the slave trade does not make its way as
an explicit prohibition into the ECHR. Thus, the ECHR structurally omits the slave trade without
debate or discussion and, as a consequence, the Convention does not explicitly require states parties to
prohibit the slave trade.
224. Siliadin v. France, App. No. 73316/01 (July 26, 2005). Siliadin was a girl from Togo who
traveled to France at 15 years-old with “Mrs. D.” The agreement was that Siliadin would work in Mrs.
D.’s home to pay for the cost of Siliadin’s airfare, while Mrs. D. would assist with immigration status
and school registration. Instead, Mrs. D. confiscated Siliadin’s passport and forced her to work as her
housemaid. When Siliadin confided to a neighbor, the French authorities were alerted to her case and
prosecuted Mr. and Mrs. B. The French courts, however, acquitted Mr. and Mrs. B. Siliadin
subsequently complained to the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), alleging a violation of
Article 4 of the ECHR. Siliadin v. France, App. No. 73316/01 (July 26, 2005).
225. “The Court notes at the outset that, according to the 1927 Slavery Convention [sic] ‘slavery
is the status or condition of a person over whom any or all of the powers attaching to the right of
ownership are exercised.’ . . . this definition corresponds to the ‘classic’ meaning of slavery as it was
practiced for centuries. Although the applicant was . . . clearly deprived of her personal autonomy, the
evidence does not suggest that she was held in slavery in the proper sense, in other words that Mr[.]
and Mrs[.] B. exercised a genuine right of legal ownership over her, thus reducing her to the status of
an ‘object.’” Siliadin, App. No. 73316/01, ¶¶ 122, 26 (July 26, 2005).
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definition of slavery as requiring legally sanctioned ownership, focusing on
the status (de jure) and not condition (de facto) situation of slavery.226 As noted
supra, the Temporary Slavery Commission reports reveal the intent of the
slavery prohibition definition to address both of these forms of slavery and
in all of its manifestations.227
When the ECtHR revisited the issue in Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia, the
Court corrected course to include de facto situations of slavery within the
scope of the international law definition of slavery.228 At the same time,
however, the Court confused and conflated human trafficking with slavery,
finding that “. . . trafficking in human beings, by its very nature and aim of
exploitation, is based on the exercise of powers attaching to the right of ownership.”229
While the Court’s jurisprudence correctly characterizes facts of the “transfer
of ownership” as evidence of slavery, the Court is structurally limited from
also characterizing such harm as an act of the slave trade, a separate human
rights violation in other regional human rights treaties and in customary
international law.230 Structurally, however, the European Human Rights
system would need to add the slave trade to its treaty provisions to address
the illicit conduct of the slave trade as a separate human rights violation as
it generally exists in international law.231
Despite these shortcomings, the positive aspect of such human rights
litigation is the potential for legal reform at the domestic level. In Siliadin v.
France, for example, the ECtHR agreed with the Applicant that France
violated Article 4 of the European Convention on Human Rights because
French criminal law did not adequately prohibit slavery, servitude, or forced
labor.232 The ECOWAS case instigated dozens of additional cases at the

226. Several scholars have criticized the judgment for this oversight of the 1926 Slavery
Convention’s intention to prohibit both the status (de jure) and condition (de facto) situations of slavery.
See, e.g., VLADISLAVA STOYANOVA, HUMAN TRAFFICKING AND SLAVERY RECONSIDERED:
CONCEPTUAL LIMITS AND STATES’ POSITIVE OBLIGATIONS IN EUROPEAN LAW 245-46 (Cambridge
University Press, 2017); Ryszard Piotrowicz, States’ Positive Obligations under Human Rights Law towards
Victims of Trafficking in Human Beings: Positive Developments in Positive Obligations, 24(2) INT’L J. REFUGEE
L. 181, 189 (2012).
227. See supra Part II. For an in-depth discussion of these nuances in the drafting of the 1926
Slavery Convention, see also Patricia Viseur Sellers & Jocelyn Getgen Kestenbaum, Sexualized Slavery’
and Customary International Law, in THE PRESIDENT ON TRIAL: PROSECUTING HISSÈNE HABRÉ
(Sharon Weill et al. eds., 2020).
228. Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia, App. No. 25965/04, ¶¶ 275, 278-79 (Jan. 7, 2010).
229. Id. (emphasis added).
230. M. and Others v. Italy and Bulgaria, App. No. 40020/03 (July 31, 2012).
231. Later, Mrs. D “lent” Siliadin to “Mr. and Mrs. B.” who forced her to cook, clean, and take
care of the children for long hours, seven days per week without pay. Siliadin v. France, App. No.
73316/01, ¶ 12 (July 26, 2005). While these facts could evince the exercise of ownership powers over
Siliadin, the illicit act could be characterized as the slave trade. As explained, however, the European
Court is limited by ECHR Article 4’s omission of the slave trade as a separate human rights prohibition.
232. Siliadin v. France, App. No. 73316/01, ¶¶ 142, 145, 148-49 (July 26, 2005).
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domestic level to enforce the prohibition of slavery and compensate victims
for harms suffered.233
Finally, while enforcement of state responsibility for international
wrongful acts by other states has been underutilized, suits before the ICJ
have been employed to haul offending states into court to account for other
international crimes, such as genocide, occurring within their borders.
Recent examples of successful use of this enforcement mechanism under
international law include the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and
Montenegro234 and the ongoing case of The Gambia v. Myanmar.235 Given that
there exists no hierarchy among international crimes, states can and should
also consider international crimes of slavery and the slave trade, which also
can be considered as acts constituting genocide, triggering erga omnes
obligations of the international community to enforce peremptory norms of
international law, including international human rights law.

C. Challenges
One challenge with the recommitment to dormant human rights
prohibitions of slavery and the slave trade is the rhetorical (over)use of the
word “slavery” or the term “modern slavery” for emotive purposes rather
than legal accuracy.236 Though the rhetoric raises funds for combatting
exploitative practices, such as human trafficking and forced labor, its misuse
causes definitional confusion and incoherence to the detriment of
compliance with international law and, thus, against the interests of victims
of both ownership and exploitation crimes.237
A second related challenge is the reluctance of states and courts to label
harms that fit under the slavery and slave trade definitions as slavery and the
slave trade. Decisionmakers regard slavery as occurring in only the most
exceptional cases (while overlooking entirely the slave trade).238 Indeed,
Michael Dottridge argues that new laws protecting against “slavery” will
233. Hadijatou Mani Koroua v. The Republic of Niger, Judgment, ECW/CCJ/JUD/06/08 (Oct.
27, 2008), https://www.law.cornell.edu/women-and-justice/resource/hadijatou_mani_koraou_v_
republic_of_niger. Also available at: http://www.worldcourts.com/ecowasccj/eng/decisions/2008.
10.27_Koraou_v_Niger.htm.
234. Application of Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crime of Genocide (Bosn. &
Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. Rep. 43 (Feb. 26) (finding violation of the
Genocide Convention).
235. Application of Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crime of Genocide (Gam. v.
Myan.), Verbatim Record (Feb. 23, 2022), https://www.icj-cij.org/public/files/case-related/178/17820220223-ORA-01-00-BI.pdf (ongoing case alleging violation of the Genocide Convention).
236. See Michael Dottridge, Trafficked and Exploited: The Urgent Need for Coherence in International Law,
in REVISITING THE LAW AND GOVERNANCE OF TRAFFICKING, FORCED LABOR AND MODERN
SLAVERY 77 (Prabha Kotiswaran ed., 2017).
237. See id.
238. See id.
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likely benefit very few actual victims of slavery.239 For all of the reluctance
to understand the true breadth of the prohibition of slavery under law, there
is little to no attention paid to the definitional parameters of the slave
trade.240
Whether states are overusing the rhetorical force of slavery or
underusing the legal prohibitions to address slavery and the slave trade to
instances where the practices are most visibly and physically violent (i.e.,
female sexualized enslavement or male forced labor exploitation), such
myopic human rights law implementation has ignored the breadth of slavery
harms in their historical and contemporary manifestations. As a result,
slavery is misunderstood and mischaracterized legally, while the slave trade
is completely overlooked. The confusion over definitional parameters may
in part come from refusals to confront past and present colonial violence
and continued structures that benefit from slavery and slave trade practices
in situations of conflict and so-called peacetime.
One further challenge is that many of the states in which slavery and
slave trade violations are widespread and/or systematic in nature are states
that practice compliance with human rights law more commonly in the
breach. In other contexts, especially those suffering protracted armed
conflict and violence, even willing states are unable to ensure justice and
accountability at the domestic level. International law’s erga omnes
requirements of other states in the international community to step in and
provide redress when violations of jus cogens norms occur, however, provide
an important stopgap for accountability in the case of slavery and the slave
trade.241 Because these violations offend all of humanity, no state should
permit impunity for such harms.
While international criminal law’s engagement with individual criminal
liability for enslavement is helping to surface and clarify the definitions to
uncover the true nature and scope of these legal prohibitions, much work is
yet to be done in human rights treaty implementation.242 Through human
rights law implementation and enforcement, the international community
may begin to confront these underlying structures and provide more

239. See id.
240. But see Sellers & Kestenbaum, supra note 3.
241. Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 94.
242. Michael Dottridge, Trafficked and Exploited: The Urgent Need for Coherence in International Law, in
REVISITING THE LAW AND GOVERNANCE OF TRAFFICKING, FORCED LABOR AND MODERN
SLAVERY 59, 77 (Prabha Kotiswaran ed., 2017); Anne T. Gallagher, The International Legal Definition of
“Trafficking in Persons”: Scope and Application, in REVISITING THE LAW AND GOVERNANCE OF
TRAFFICKING, FORCED LABOR AND MODERN SLAVERY 83 (Prabha Kotiswaran ed., 2017). Compare
to human trafficking, where definitional discussions and divergence in the human trafficking arena
have served as proxies for the more complicated debates on related issues of sex work and migration.
See id. at 85-86.
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effective and complete redress to victims-survivors of one of the oldest and
most persistent abuses prohibited under international law.

CONCLUSION
Abolitionist movements have worked over the past two centuries to
prohibit the slave trade, slavery, and other servitudes—which has included
“slavery-like practices” of forced labor, debt bondage, serfdom, servile
marriage, and child trafficking—in international law.243 In the 19th century,
states began taking concrete legal steps toward abolition, first by suppressing
the slave trade, prohibiting the Trans-Atlantic and East African Slave Trades
through unilateral declarations and bilateral or multilateral treaties.244 As
examined above, slavery and the slave trade definitions are intentionally
broad to prohibit these harms in all their forms. Additionally, these
international law prohibitions provide the highest form of juridical and

243. See, e.g., 1926 Slavery Convention; 1956 Supplementary Slavery Convention; JEAN ALLAIN,
SLAVERY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: OF HUMAN EXPLOITATION AND TRAFFICKING 105 (2012);
JENNY S. MARTINEZ, THE SLAVE TRADE AND THE ORIGINS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
LAW (2012) (examining the origins of international human rights law through the lens of slavery and
the slave trade). Each of these harms in international law has a relationship to slavery and the slave
trade, and to a greater or lesser extent has been confused or conflated with slavery (rarely the slave
trade), but such analysis is beyond the scope of this Article. Legal distinctions have often coincided
with continuing to legitimize some practices over others due to colonizers’ or States’ economic
interests. See generally SUZANNE MIERS, SLAVERY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY: THE EVOLUTION
OF A GLOBAL PROBLEM (2003) (tracing the international anti-slavery movement over time).
244. See, e.g., Declaration Relative to the Universal Abolition of the Slave Trade (‘Congress of
Vienna, Act XV’) 2 Martens 432 (Feb. 8, 1815), reprinted in 63 Parry’s 473; Treaty for the Suppression
of the African Slave Trade (‘Treaty of London’) 10 Martens 392 (Dec. 20, 1841), reprinted in 92 Parry’s
437; Declaration Respecting the Abolition of the Slave Trade (‘Congress of Verona’) 16 Martens 139
(Nov. 28, 1822), reprinted in 772 Parry’s 32; General Act of the Conference Respecting the Congo
(‘General Act of Berlin’) 10 Martens (2d) 414 (Feb. 26, 1885), reprinted in 3 ASIL 7 (1909); June 5,
1873 Treaty between her Majesty and the Sultan of Zanzibar, Suppression of the Slave Trade,
https://www.pdavis.nl/FrereTreaty.htm; Convention Relative to the Slave Trade and Importation into
Africa of Firearms, Ammunition, and Spirituous Liquors (‘General Act of Brussels’) 17 Martens (2d)
345, 27 Stat. 886, T.S. No. 383 (July 2, 1890), reprinted in 173 Parry’s 293; Treaty between Great Britain
and Spain for the Suppression of the African Slave Trade, 18 Martens (2d) 168 (July 2, 1890), reprinted
in Parliamentary Papers, 1892, vol. XCV, 735, T.S. No. 3 (1892); 1919 Convention Revising the General
Act of Berlin, 26 February 1885, and the General Act of the Declaration of Brussels (‘Treaty of SaintGermain-en-Laye’) 8 L.N.T.S. 25, 49 Stat. 3027, T.S. 877 (Sept. 10, 1919), reprinted in 14 Martens (3d)
12. See generally JENNY S. MARTINEZ, THE SLAVE TRADE AND THE ORIGINS OF INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS (2012) (stating that the abolition movement became important for British politics in
the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries); see also Jean Allain, Nineteenth Century Law of the Sea
and the British Abolition of the Slave Trade, 2007 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 342-88 (2008) (stating that Great
Britain made efforts during the nineteenth century to prevent the slave trade). Patricia Viseur Sellers &
Jocelyn Getgen Kestenbaum, Missing in Action: The International Crime of the Slave Trade, J. INT’L CRIM.
JUST. (2020) (praising the efforts made in the nineteenth century to abolish the slave trade). M. Cherif
Bassiouni, Enslavement as an International Crime, 23 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 454 (1991) (“In making
the trade an international crime, treaties allowed states to search and detain vessels if the ships were
thought to be carrying slaves.”).
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jurisdictional protections of any human rights norms.245 While concrete
reasons may explain their dormancy in recent decades, new shifts have
highlighted a need to recommit to enforcing these international human
rights law prohibitions toward survivor-centered approaches that call for
structural changes in addition to criminal legal responses that target
individual bad actors.
Realist and critical legal scholars often have pointed out that overlegalization and over-judicialization are inappropriate, expensive, and
possibly even counterproductive ways to address human rights violations.246
Little evidence exists, however, to suggest that international human rights
law is over-legalized or over-judicialized.247 Rather, the strength and
legitimacy of human rights law is that it is instrumentalized by social
movements that are inspired and guided by treaty guarantees.248 Human
rights is more than law—it is a discourse and movements that are nearly
universally understood by all human beings—that, by virtue of being
human, they have rights that the state has agreed to protect and uphold.
Thus, human rights law permits the people to push for change and effective
solutions—international and domestic criminal law take much of this agency
away and place power in the hands of experts and legally trained prosecutors
and judges. The human rights regime, and the justice it provides, must
remain accessible to average people.
This is not to say human rights law should stop focusing on human
trafficking or other human rights harms. This Article posits widening and
shifting the lens, but not at the expense of exploitation. Exploitation is also
a harm we want to combat. It is time to commit to using all of the tools in
the human rights and international law toolbox toward the enforcement of
slavery and slave trade prohibitions. Given that the human rights legal
regime protecting against slavery and the slave trade is structurally robust,
and, given that human rights law enforcement matters and may have
broader, more effective messaging capacity toward transformative change
than does the carceral approach under international criminal law, this Article
argues for a recommitment to enforcing these prohibitions toward full
redress of harms against individuals enslaved and slave traded today.

245. See supra Part I.
246. Karen Engle, Liberal Internationalism, Feminism, and the Suppression of the Critique: Contemporary
Approaches to Global Order in the United States, 46 HARV. INT’L L.J. 427, 427-41 (2005) (realist view); Jack
Snyder & Leslie Vinjamori, Trials and Errors: Principle and Pragmatism in Strategies of International Justice, 28
INT’L SEC. 5, 5-44 (2004) (critical legal studies views).
247. See SIMMONS, supra note 109.
248. See Lisa Hajjar, Human Rights in Israel/Palestine: The History and Politics of a Movement, 30 J.
PALESTINE STUD. 21, 21-38 (2001).
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